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DEADLY “TOXINS”: A NATIONAL EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RACIAL BIAS AND FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS DETERMINATIONS
Justin D. Levinson,* G. Ben Cohenà & Koichi Hioki•
Since the beginning of the modern Death Penalty Era, one of
the most important—and fraught—areas of capital
punishment has been the so-called “future dangerousness”
determination, a threshold inquiry that literally rests the
defendant’s life or death on jurors’ predictions of the future. An
overwhelming majority of capital executions have occurred in
jurisdictions that embrace the perceived legitimacy of the future
dangerousness inquiry, despite its obvious flaws and potential
connection to the age-old racial disparities that continue to
plague capital punishment. This Article presents, and
empirically tests, the hypothesis that jurors’ future
dangerousness assessments cannot be separated from their
racial and ethnic biases held against Black and Latino
defendants. It does so by examining two pathways whereby
future
dangerousness
judgments
may
function
in
inappropriately racialized ways: First, it studies the domain of
implicit bias and investigates, using Implicit Association Tests
(IATs) we designed, whether jurors implicitly and
automatically associate future danger with Black and Latino
men, and conversely, associate future safety with White men.
Second, it considers the domain of explicit bias and measures
whether jurors’ self-reported racial animus may function as a
driving force in future dangerousness judgments. The results of
the studies show that, indeed, both implicit and explicit biases
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are inexorably linked with future dangerous determinations.
After presenting the studies in detail, the Article situates the
findings within death penalty jurisprudence and concludes
that future dangerousness can no longer pass constitutional
muster as a mandatory or permissible factor in capital cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At his capital murder trial, Duane Buck looked on from the
defense table as an expert witness testified that Mr. Buck was likely
to be a future danger to society simply because he was Black.1 In
the wake of that racialized testimony, a jury sentenced Mr. Buck to
death, sending him to Texas’s death row, where he waited on
appeals for more than two decades.2 In 2017, the Supreme Court
finally recognized the improper use of the future dangerousness
testimony and overturned Mr. Buck’s death sentence.3 Chief Justice
John Roberts, who authored the Court’s majority opinion, explained
that, at least in the context of racial bias and the death penalty,
“[s]ome toxins can be deadly in small doses.”4 Although Mr. Buck

1 See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 769 (2017) (describing the expert testimony of Dr.
Walter Quijano who believed that “the race factor, black, increases the future dangerousness”
factor). The testimony was unusual in Mr. Buck’s case because his own counsel had elicited
it. See id. at 767–69 (noting that although the expert, Dr. Quijano, ultimately concluded Mr.
Buck was unlikely to be a future danger, he also provided a report that indicated that Mr.
“Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black” and that “read, in
relevant part: ‘Race. Black: Increased probability’”); id. at 769 (“After opening crossexamination with a series of general questions, the prosecutor likewise turned to the report.
She asked first about the statistical factors of past crimes and age, then questioned Dr.
Quijano about the roles of sex and race: ‘You have determined that the sex factor, that a male
is more violent than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor, black,
increases the future dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?’ . . . Dr.
Quijano replied, ‘Yes.’” (quoting Joint Appendix at 170a, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 158049), 2016 WL 4120631, at *170a)).
2 See id. at 767–73 (describing the facts and procedural history of Buck’s case, beginning
in 1995, as “wander[ing]” in “a labyrinth of state and federal collateral review” until arriving
at the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016).
3 See id. at 777, 780 (noting that the Court could not “accept the District Court’s conclusion
that ‘the introduction of any mention of race’ during the penalty phase was ‘de minimis’” and
thus reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit). As the Court noted in Buck, similar racialized
dangerousness testimony was given in at least five other trials, in cases introduced by the
prosecution. See id. at 779. The Attorney General of Texas eventually conceded penalty phase
error in those cases. See id. at 777–79 (“[T]he State has repeatedly attempted to justify its
decision to treat Buck differently from the other five defendants identified in the Attorney
General’s statement, . . . arguing that Buck’s was the only one of the six cases in which defense
counsel, not the prosecution, first elicited Dr. Quijano’s opinion on race.”).
4 Id. at 777 (“There were only ‘two references to race in Dr. Quijano’s testimony’—one
during direct examination, the other on cross. . . . But when a jury hears expert testimony
that expressly makes a defendant’s race directly pertinent on the question of life or death,
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received a reprieve from death row,5 the Court did not address a
more pressing question arising from the disproportionate numbers
of Black and Latino men who remain on death row: Is future
dangerousness testimony, a staple of so many death penalty
verdicts, so inexorably tainted with racial bias that its very use
violates the Constitution?
For decades, facing study after study that revealed continuing
and pervasive racial inequalities in capital punishment,6 scholars
and practitioners have argued that juror judgments of a defendant’s
future dangerousness may well be tainted by harmful racial
stereotypes.7 Yet despite the clarity of the critique, the role of the
the impact of that evidence cannot be measured simply by how much air time it received at
trial or how many pages it occupies in the record.”).
5 See id. at 780 (concluding Mr. Buck was entitled to relief).
6 See generally, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002)
(presenting the evolution of capital punishment, the arguments for and against capital
punishment, the changes in crimes considered capital offenses, the methods of execution, and
America’s experience with capital punishment); FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE:
RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2006) (discussing America’s deep history of racializing the death penalty, specifically through
the lynching of African Americans); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997)
(addressing the history of race within criminal law, how race affects jury composition, the
unfair trials and allegations against African Americans, and the role of race in death penalty
cases). For a general discussion of race and the death penalty, see DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE
WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (analyzing evidence of arbitrariness and racial
discrimination in capital sentencing post Furman v. Georgia and the unlikelihood of
improvement resulting from McCleskey v. Kemp); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO,
DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING xiii (1989) (“The
Supreme Court has more or less acknowledged that race continues to play a major role in
capital sentencing in America . . . . But the Court has decided to do nothing about this form
of discrimination and to refuse to hear future claims based on it.”); and William J. Bowers,
Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171,
175 (2001) (“Since the Civil War, blacks have been executed for lesser crimes, at younger
ages, and more often without appeals than whites; and over this period they have been
disproportionately executed for crimes against whites.” (footnote omitted)).
7 See Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to
Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 327–28, 359 (2012)
(explaining the influence of racial schemas on “jurors’ assessments of [a defendant’s] future
dangerousness” in capital sentencing and how “implicit racial bias could lead jurors to
interpret any ambiguous evidence consistent with greater moral culpability and a higher risk
of future dangerousness”); see also Michael R. Cavanaugh, Marilyn McShane & Frank P.
Williams III, Confronting the Demons of Future Dangerousness, 2 J.L. & CRIM. JUST. 47, 56,
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future dangerousness determination in capital punishment remains
prevalent and powerful in many jurisdictions, including in the
federal death penalty, where a majority of capital convictions
continue to include a jury finding of future dangerousness.8 Scholars
have taken sharp aim at the role of future dangerousness
determinations, noting that jury predictions vastly over-include
non-dangerous individuals,9 and, as Professor Lee Kovarsky

58–59 (2014) (examining the potential for racial bias due to the influence of media and social
networks on jurors’ judgments of future dangerousness in capital punishment cases); Bowers
et al., supra note 6, at 225–26 (explaining how “white jurors were the most likely, and black
jurors the least likely, to report that the defendant’s future dangerousness made them much
more likely to vote for the death penalty” in cases with Black defendants and White victims);
cf. Matthew S. Crow, The Complexities of Prior Record, Race, Ethnicity, and Policy: Interactive
Effects in Sentencing, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 502, 507 (2008) (“[D]ecision makers incorporate
other information about the offense and offender to develop a perceptual shorthand that aids
in deciding sentences . . . . Among the characteristics believed to influence this perceptual
shorthand is the offender’s race. Stereotypical assessments of the dangerousness of racial
(and ethnic) minorities are believed to contribute to the determinations made by judges.”
(citations omitted)).
8 See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. Future dangerousness determinations are
also relevant to other areas of law, including pre-trial release determinations, sentencing,
and parole decisions. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275–76 (1976) (plurality opinion). The
empirical study presented in this Article is relevant to those areas, but for purposes of clarity,
this Article primarily focuses on the role of future dangerousness determinations in the death
penalty.
9 Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness” Catches
the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It
Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 148 (2008); see also Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball
Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 713 (2015) (arguing that “risk-assessment tools are stuck at
sentencing: they assess an individual’s likelihood of future dangerousness by examining
various characteristics that might change over time,” which leads to unnecessary
incarceration of non-dangerous individuals); William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope
Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing Life-Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life
Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1078 (2015) (discussing the inaccuracy of future
dangerousness estimates because of how most “criminal offenders have not reached”
“complete social and emotional maturity” and that “most criminal offenders cease to be
dangerous once [they] reach[] a certain elderly age”); Martin R. Gardner, Commentary, The
Renaissance of Retribution—An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 786
(reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976)) (“Incarceration because of predicted
dangerousness is unsatisfactory because the ability to make accurate predictions does not
exist and the tendency to over-predict results in many non-dangerous offenders being
deprived of their liberty for longer periods than they would have been if prediction had not
influenced the sentence.”); cf. Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence
of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST.
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observed in 2019, are “exceptionally unreliable” in a multiplicity of
ways.10 Nonetheless, race-based legal challenges to the death
penalty, and future dangerousness in particular, continue to stall,11
and there remains a striking lack of empirical work examining the
role of racial bias in future dangerousness determinations.
In Buck, the Court reversed the death sentence because the
explicit reference to race introduced a visible poison into the death
penalty process.12 But what if the concept of future dangerousness
L.Q. 189, 257 (2004) (arguing that future dangerousness predictions “are wrong more often
than they are right” and that it is hard “to imagine that the jury will be competent at any
time soon to reliably sort dangerous and non-dangerous offenders”).
10 Lee Kovarsky, The American Execution Queue, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1206 (2019); see
also Carla Edmondson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerousness Mandates
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857, 860, 862 (2016) (asserting that
“[t]he future dangerousness question impermissibly asks jurors to function as fortune tellers,
basing their sentencing determination on the likelihood of some future, unascertained event”
and that it “is a fundamentally flawed question that leads to arbitrary and capricious death
sentences”); Berry, supra note 9, at 1078 (“Many estimates suggest that dangerousness
estimates are only 50% accurate at best.”); Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of
Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious
Decision-Making, 29 L. & PSYCH. REV. 63, 92, 101–02 (2005) (noting that “jurors have been
shown to make highly subjective and severely overestimated assessments of future
dangerousness,” leading them to “find that only a small percentage of convicted capital
offenders do not pose a future threat”); Bowers et al., supra note 6, at 219 (explaining the
unreliability of imposing a death sentence based on a defendant’s future dangerousness
because such estimates “incorporate racial stereotypes” and “culturally rooted racial
stereotypes may tend to demonize and dehumanize blacks accused of lethal violence by
portraying them as especially dangerous”); Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
at 4, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) (“The unreliability of psychiatric
predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the
profession.”); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 749 (1974) (“We have seen
that predictions of dangerous behavior are wrong more often than they are right even in those
cases in which the subject of the prediction has actually done or threatened something
dangerous in the past. And without such evidence of past dangerous behavior, predictions of
dangerous behavior are even more inaccurate.”).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The
Supreme Court has discussed with approbative language the submission of a defendant’s
future dangerousness as a subject for a penalty jury’s consideration. Not surprisingly, lower
courts have uniformly upheld future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating factor in
capital cases . . . .” (citations omitted)).
12 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017) (“Relying on race to impose a criminal sanction
‘poisons public confidence’ in the judicial process . . . .” (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257,
285 (2015))).
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is always tied toxically to race, even when it is not visible and
explicit? Juror judgments of future dangerousness play a prominent
role in capital punishment cases, especially in separating those who
receive prison sentences from those who are executed when the
jurisprudence limits application of the death penalty to the “worst
of the worst.”13 Although there are various paths that juries can
take to arrive at a death verdict, our analysis indicates that a
disproportionate number of defendants who have been sentenced to
death—and those who have been executed—have been found by
juries to be future dangers.14 Indeed, while the broad death penalty
trajectory in the United States has been in decline,15 the influence
of the future dangerousness determination has grown in paramount
ways.
This Article presents, and empirically tests, the hypothesis that
jurors’ future dangerousness assessments cannot be separated from
their racial and ethnic biases held against Black and Latino
defendants. It does so by examining two pathways whereby
dangerousness judgments may function in inappropriately
racialized ways: First, it studies the domain of implicit bias and
investigates, using Implicit Association Tests (IATs)16 that we
designed, whether jurors implicitly and automatically associate
future dangerousness with Black and Latino men, and conversely,
associate future safety with White men. Second, it considers the
domain of explicit bias and measures whether jurors’ self-reported
racial views and stereotypes may function as a driving force in
See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death
penalty must be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst.’” (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
568 (2005))); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“[T]he death penalty is reserved for a narrow category
of crimes and offenders.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“[O]ur jurisprudence
has consistently confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of the most
serious crimes.”); see also Kovarsky, supra note 10, at 1165 (“In producing death sentences,
U.S. jurisdictions expend considerable resources sorting the ‘worst of the worst’ from the
‘worst of the really bad.’” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1186 n.135 (“There are many reasons to
believe that most jurisdictions fail to select the worst of the worst for death sentences . . . .”).
14 See infra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow & Ankur Desai, The American Death
Penalty Decline, 107 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 561, 564 (2017) (“The American criminal
justice system is imposing fewer death sentences than at any point in the past three
decades.”).
16 For a description of the Implicit Association Test and its methods, see infra notes 111–
114 and accompanying text.
13
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future dangerousness judgments. After presenting the results of the
studies in detail, this Article tackles the wide-ranging implications
of these examinations and concludes that future dangerousness
cannot pass muster as a mandatory or permissible factor in capital
cases.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides legal
background concerning the death penalty and the future
dangerousness inquiry. It explains how the future dangerousness
determination became one of the most important inquiries in the
American death penalty (at both federal and state levels) and
highlights the ways in which the law amplifies the importance of
this particular jury-led, subjective, and predictive inquiry. Part III
situates the literature on race and future dangerousness in the
context of empirical scholarship related to implicit and explicit bias,
juries, and capital punishment. Part III then recognizes the absence
of empirical research on racial bias in future dangerousness
determinations and sets the stage for the empirical studies we
conducted.
Part IV reports on the national empirical studies we conducted.
We surveyed a diverse sample of over 570 jury-eligible citizens,
measured their implicit and explicit racial biases, and then asked
them to assess the future dangerousness of several defendants. The
results of the studies show, first, that the jurors possessed strong
anti-Black and anti-Latino implicit future dangerousness biases,
and second, that the jurors’ anti-Black implicit and explicit racial
biases predicted their dangerousness judgments: the more racial
bias they held, the more of a future danger they believed defendants
to be. Part V discusses these results in a practical and constitutional
context and concludes by claiming that future dangerousness can
no longer play a role in capital cases.

II. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: AN AMORPHOUS PREDICTION
TAKES ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE
Future dangerousness has been a central component of death
penalty jurisprudence since 1976.17 Although juries are almost
17 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–76 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Texas
death penalty statute that included a requirement to consider a convicted person’s future

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/5

10

Levinson et al.: Deadly 'Toxins'

2021]

DEADLY “TOXINS”

235

always tasked with making decisions based on discrete events from
the past, in the context of capital sentencing they are often asked to
predict how a particular defendant may or may not act in the
future.18 Despite the obvious risks of basing a life-and-death
decision on jurors’ ability to predict the future, over 90% of
executions since 1976 have come from jurisdictions that either
require or otherwise permit jurors to make such a prediction.19 As
this Part explains, the death penalty has evolved over the past five
decades in such a way as to amplify the importance of the future
dangerousness determination. Even setting aside the massive
historical racial disparities in the American death penalty, capital
cases’ reliance on future dangerousness would be concerning
enough. But considering the historical inexorability of race and the
death penalty,20 the reliance on this forward-looking dangerousness
prediction becomes particularly fraught. Indeed, if juror judgments
of defendants’ future dangerousness are at all influenced by race in
a consistent manner, the removal of future dangerousness from the
capital equation should be required.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND THE BIRTH OF FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS

In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia held that the death
penalty, as it was administered at that time, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, a holding that sent death-penalty-seeking
states back to the drawing board.21 In Furman, two justices
dangerousness because “prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element” in
many decisions in criminal cases).
18 See, e.g., id. at 272 (describing the Texas statute’s requirement that the jury determine
how likely the defendant was to commit future violent crimes that would make him a threat
to society).
19 See Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executions-overview/number-of-executions-by-stateand-region-since-1976 (last visited Dec. 16, 2021) (charting the number of executions by state
and region since 1976). For detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction execution and death row
statistics underlying this number, see infra Table 1.
20 See supra note 6.
21 See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that “the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty” in petitioner’s murder and rape convictions “constitute[d] cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
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suggested that evolving standards of decency rendered the death
penalty cruel and unusual punishment.22 Justice Stewart, writing a
concurring opinion in support of the Court’s per curiam decision,
focused on the arbitrariness of the Georgia statute’s life-death
decision and observed that the wanton freakishness of the death
penalty vitiated the validity of the punishment.23 While Furman
was fractured in multiple separate opinions,24 the Court almost
uniformly rejected the notion that the Eighth Amendment solely
prohibited punishments thought cruel and barbarous at the
adoption of the Constitution; a majority of justices agreed that the
constitutionality of a punishment required an assessment of the
evolving standards of decency.25
Four years later, in July 1976, the Court issued a flurry of five
opinions addressing separate statutes that had been rapidly
adopted by states aiming to reinstate the death penalty and

22 See id. at 269–70 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“We know ‘that the words of the [Clause] are
not precise, and that their scope is not static.’ We know, therefore, that the Clause ‘must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958))); id. at
329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he cruel and unusual language ‘must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ Thus,
a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation’s history is not necessarily
permissible today.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)).
23 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”).
24 The historical account of the internal deliberations of the Justices was described by
Professor Carol Steiker—with reference to Evan Mandery’s book about the Justices’ decisions
titled A Wild Justice—in oral testimony in a Vermont case. See Transcript of Motions Hearing
at 12–13, United States v. Fell, No. 5:01-cr-12-01, 2018 WL 4258111 (D. Vt. Sept. 6, 2018)
(“But because the decision was so close, five to four, and so fractured, there were nine opinions
in the, in the case, one from each of the nine justices . . . .”); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362 (1995) (“The opinions presented a
staggering array of arguments for and against the constitutionality of the death penalty and
offered little means, aside from shrewd political prediction, of determining which arguments
would dominate in the decision of any future cases.”).
25 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 24, at 362 (“Only Justices Brennan and Marshall
argued in Furman that the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual punishment; Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White expressly left open the question whether a more structured
capital sentencing regime might someday pass constitutional muster.” (footnote omitted)).
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presumably avoid the Furman arbitrariness problem.26 Born from
those five opinions was a new understanding of the death penalty
that has directly led to today’s legal landscape. In two opinions,
Roberts v. Louisiana and Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court set
outer limits of the penalty, rejecting mandatory death sentences
because the death penalty statutes in those states failed to allow
juries to consider the character and background of the defendant
before imposing the death penalty.27 Conversely, three death
penalty statutes based more on individualized formulations of the
life-death calculus—those of Georgia, Florida, and Texas—were
upheld by the Court.28 The Georgia and Florida statutes, which
relied upon a consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in
each case, were upheld because they narrowed the class of
defendants and allowed individualized consideration.29 These state
victories spurred the rapid response of some state legislatures
passing similar statutes, including Louisiana’s and North
Carolina’s legislatures, whose prior laws had just been ruled
unconstitutional.30

26 See id. at 363–64 (describing “Gregg and its accompanying quartet” that “selected certain
themes of the vast Furman morass to represent the Court’s central concerns”).
27 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that
capital cases require the “consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (finding that the Louisiana death penalty statute “not only lacks standards
to guide the jury in selecting among first-degree murderers, but it plainly invites the jurors
to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the death
penalty is inappropriate”).
28 See infra notes 29, 31 and accompanying text.
29 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The new Georgia
sentencing procedures . . . focus the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.”); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida
statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various aggravating circumstances to
be weighed against the mitigating ones. . . . [Moreover,] the Florida statute has a provision
designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group
of convicted defendants.”).
30 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2021) (allowing capital punishment only “in accordance with
the determination of the jury” rather than automatic application); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000 (2021) (allowing the jury to consider evidence showing aggravating or mitigating
circumstances in a capital sentencing decision).
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The Texas death penalty statute, as considered in Jurek v. Texas,
was unique.31 It differed from Georgia and Florida’s statutes
because it did not rely on an individualized consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors.32 Rather, it attempted to tackle
the individualization of the death penalty by mandating the
imposition of the death penalty for individuals convicted of capital
murder based upon a jury’s finding of future dangerousness.33 To
some observers, by predicating a death sentence upon a jury finding
of future dangerousness, the Texas statute appeared to combine all
the flaws of the mandatory death penalty scheme with all the
problems of the unguided schemes that the petitioners had
identified in Furman: the Texas death penalty was indeed
mandatory,34 and its usage would predictably be confined to the
poor, the powerless, and those perceived as dangerous.35 However,
as part of a strategic decision apparently made to avoid conceding
that any death penalty statute was constitutional, Jurek’s counsel
chose not to challenge the Texas statute based on Furman-like
arbitrariness grounds.36 Rather, Jurek’s counsel approached the

31 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270–72 (1976) (noting differences between the Texas
statute and the death penalty statutes in Georgia and Florida).
32 See id. at 270–72 (noting that “Texas ha[d] not adopted a list of statutory aggravating
circumstances” like Georgia and Florida, nor did the “Texas statute . . . explicitly speak of
mitigating circumstances”).
33 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2021) (directing the court to submit
the issue of “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society” to the jury); see also Jurek, 428
U.S. at 272–74 (describing the future dangerousness question and the jury’s analysis of
mitigating and aggravating factors in that inquiry).
34 Cf. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (“By narrowing its definition of capital murder, Texas has
essentially said that there must be at least one statutory aggravating circumstance . . . before
a death sentence may even be considered.”).
35 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Yet we
know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the
penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular
minority . . . .”).
36 See EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 361 (2013) (“Yet [counsel] never considered conceding the
constitutionality of capital punishment . . . . In its submissions to the Court, [counsel’s] thrust
remained . . . that capital punishment in any form violated the Eighth Amendment.”).
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legal challenge as a broader-scale Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment challenge to the death penalty.37
In writing about the Jurek decision, Evan Mandery observed that
Justice Powell’s notes concerning the petitioner’s argument
indicated that it was “fairly persuasive” but that the issue was left
unresolved, as counsel for Jurek “viewed it as unfair to spare some
from the death penalty while others received it.”38 Ultimately, the
Court rejected the argument that future dangerousness was an
inquiry that was meaningless at best and reasoned that:
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The
fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does
not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of
future criminal conduct is an essential element in many
of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal
justice system. The decision whether to admit a
defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a
judge’s prediction of the defendant’s future conduct.
And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted
person’s probable future conduct when it engages in the
process of determining what punishment to impose. For
those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must
be made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas
jury must perform in answering the statutory question
in issue is thus basically no different from the task
37 Id. Evan Mandery noted that the Texas “statute was so unusual and so problematic that
Jurek’s best strategy almost certainly would have been to ignore the cruel-and-unusual
argument and simply expose the Texas law as a mandatory one.” Id. at 360–61. As Mandery
recounted, Petitioners in Jurek had argued the Texas statute by attacking the future
dangerousness determination:

“The thing that is most devastating is that you can’t even challenge the jury’s
finding because the question to which it responds is so meaningless. You can say
that on this record that the jury in this case found, without sufficient evidence, the
defendant was guilty of capital murder. I mean, that is a question that has
meaning.” But, [counsel] asked, “How can you—even on the absurd basis on which
this jury condemned this defendant to die—say that the evidence is or is not
sufficient to establish that there is a probability that the defendant may engage in
future criminal conduct? The question is devoid of intelligible meaning.”
Id. at 376.
38 Id. at 376, 378.
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performed countless times each day throughout the
American system of criminal justice. What is essential
is that the jury have before it all possible relevant
information about the individual defendant whose fate
it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all
such evidence will be adduced.39
Upon his retirement, Justice Stevens, the critical fifth vote in
Jurek, described it as the one case in which he could have changed
his vote: “In my judgment we made a mistake on that case.”40
Nonetheless, Jurek stood and thus began the dawn of the future
dangerousness era.
B. THE EXPANSION OF THE FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS INQUIRY

After Jurek, the use and importance of the future dangerousness
inquiry began to grow in multiple ways. First, it grew through
judicial expansion.41 Second, it grew through the passing of new
statutes in states beyond Texas.42 And third, it grew through
legislative and judicial inaction, such that when prosecutors began
to raise it in jurisdictions that made no mention of it in their laws,
courts and legislatures chose not to prohibit it.43 In each of these

Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274–76 (footnotes omitted).
MANDERY, supra note 36, at 439–40.
41 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 905 (1983) (“There is no doubt that the
psychiatric testimony [about future dangerousness] increased the likelihood that petitioner
would be sentenced to death, but this fact does not make that evidence inadmissible . . . .”);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (“Consideration of a defendant’s past conduct
as indicative of his probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element of
criminal sentencing . . . .”).
42 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (West 2017) (amended 2019) (providing
that one of the issues submitted to a death penalty jury is “[w]hether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 1977) (repealed 2021) (providing that
the death penalty may be imposed if the jury “find[s] that there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society”).
43 See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 (discussing the admissibility of evidence regarding a
defendant’s potential future dangerousness as an aggravating factor despite the South
Carolina death penalty statute not mentioning such a consideration); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-339
40
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ways, the importance of the future dangerousness inquiry increased
and moved further away from constitutional scrutiny.
Seven years after Jurek, judicial expansion began in Barefoot v.
Estelle, which considered whether experts should be permitted to
testify as to a defendant’s possible future dangerousness.44 The
Court held that psychiatrist testimony as to a defendant’s future
dangerousness in the penalty phase of a capital trial was indeed
admissible.45 The Court based its holding on Jurek, stating,
If the likelihood of a defendant committing further
crimes is a constitutionally acceptable criterion for
imposing the death penalty, which it is, and if it is not
impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at
that conclusion, it makes little sense, if any, to submit
that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons
who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so
little about the subject that they should not be
permitted to testify.46
The Court made its holding in Barefoot despite the Court’s own
acknowledgment that “[t]here is no doubt that the psychiatric
testimony increased the likelihood that petitioner would be
sentenced to death”47 and an amicus brief presented by the
American Psychiatric Association showing that “[t]he unreliability
of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by
now an established fact within the profession.”48

20 (2021) (listing aggravating factors the jury may consider, none of which is future
dangerousness).
44 See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898–99 (“If the jury may make up its mind about future
dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing
the views of the State’s psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant’s doctors.”).
45 See id. at 905–06 (holding that psychiatrist testimony about a defendant’s future
dangerousness was admissible).
46 Id. at 896–97 (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 905.
48 Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae, supra note 10, at 4).
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And out of Pandora’s box, the idea of judicially-blessed future
dangerousness spread.49 Even in jurisdictions such as South
Carolina, where statutes made no mention of future
dangerousness,50 prosecutors began using the argument as part of
their aggravating factor analysis, and courts moved out of their
way.51 Furthermore, in multiple cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
appeared to create an entire exception to the ordinary rule
excluding juries from making decisions based upon estimates of
what might happen next rather than what had already transpired,
permitting their use in the determination of whether death was the
appropriate punishment.52 In 1994, the Simmons Court reasoned,
Arguments relating to a defendant’s future
dangerousness ordinarily would be inappropriate at the
guilt phase of a trial, as the jury is not free to convict a
defendant simply because he poses a future danger; nor
is a defendant’s future dangerousness likely relevant to
the question whether each element of an alleged offense
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But where
the jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital
trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the guiltinnocence determination step into the foreground and
require consideration at the sentencing phase. The
defendant’s character, prior criminal history, mental
capacity, background, and age are just a few of the

49 See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 (“[E]vidence that a defendant would in the future pose a danger
to the community if he were not executed may be treated as establishing an ‘aggravating
factor’ for purposes of capital sentencing . . . .” (first citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(plurality opinion); and then citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880)).
50 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (2021).
51 See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 (permitting consideration of future dangerousness as “an
inevitable and not undesirable element of criminal sentencing” and of “evidence that the
defendant would not pose a danger” as a mitigating factor).
52 See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(distinguishing between jury determinations of future dangerousness in the “guilt-innocence
determination” and the jury’s “sentencing responsibilities in a capital trial” based on prior
caselaw (first citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); then citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); and then citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948–51 (1983)
(plurality opinion))).
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many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that
a jury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment.53
As Justice Blackmun explained further in Simmons,
[P]rosecutors in South Carolina, like those in other
States that impose the death penalty, frequently
emphasize a defendant’s future dangerousness in their
evidence and argument at the sentencing phase; they
urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death so that
he will not be a danger to the public if released from
prison.54
In addition to expansion fueled by courts, various state legislatures
got into the act: Oregon and Virginia embraced the future
dangerousness approach to the death penalty and enacted laws
specifically referencing it, with Oregon’s law functioning much like
Texas’s55 and with Virginia providing future dangerousness as one
of two findings that jurors can make before recommending the death

Id.
Id.
55 Texas’s death penalty statute focuses juries’ death determinations on “whether there is
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 2021).
The same was true in Oregon: “Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the
court shall submit the following issues to the jury: . . . Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society . . . .” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(b) (West 2017) (amended 2019).
53
54
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penalty.56 Other states, such as Oklahoma,57 Idaho,58 and
Wyoming,59 passed legislation that did not automatically equate
future dangerousness with an immediate death sentence but rather
created a hybrid approach, whereby future dangerousness became
listed as a statutory aggravating factor.60 In Washington, the
statute provided that the jury may decide to be lenient based on
“[w]hether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a
danger to others in the future.”61 In 2018, however, the Washington
State Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional
because it was applied in a racist manner.62
56

Virginia’s statute reads as follows:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court
or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that
the penalty of death be imposed.

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 1977) (repealed 2021).
57 “Aggravating circumstances shall be: . . . The existence of a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society . . . .” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 2011).
58 “The following are statutory aggravating circumstances . . . The defendant, by his
conduct, whether such conduct was before, during or after the commission of the murder at
hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a
continuing threat to society.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (West 2021).
59 “Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following: . . . The defendant poses a
substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued
acts of criminal violence . . . .” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (West 2021).
60 See supra notes 57–59. Idaho and Oklahoma courts have also considered psychiatric
testimony as evidence of a defendant’s continuing threat to society or propensity for future
violence. See State v. Dunlap, 873 P.2d 784, 790 (Idaho 1993) (finding that the psychiatric
evidence in the case supported “the district court’s finding that [defendant] has the propensity
to commit murder which will probably constitute a threat to society”); Thompson v. State, 724
P.2d 780, 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (“[The expert witness’s] testimony was used solely to
prove the existence of a probability that the appellant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”), vacated, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
61 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(8) (2021).
62 State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018) (“[W]e hold that Washington’s death
penalty is unconstitutional, as administered, because it is imposed in an arbitrary and
racially biased manner.”).
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Fourteen other states and the federal death penalty allow future
dangerousness to play a non-statutory aggravator role in death
penalty determinations.63 While consideration of future
63 See Dorland & Krauss, supra note 10 at 64–65, 65 n.12 (listing “ways in which states
incorporate future dangerousness into” sentencing, including “allow[ing] prosecutors to argue
future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating factor” and citing caselaw from fourteen
states that demonstrates this practice); 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (listing aggravating and mitigating
factors to be considered in federal death penalty sentencing). New Hampshire, Kentucky,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and South Dakota have
recognized future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravator. See State v. Addison, 87 A.3d
1, 206 (N.H. 2013) (finding that the defendant’s future dangerousness was an acceptable nonstatutory aggravating factor); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 853 (Ky. 2000)
(finding it acceptable that the jury considered the defendant’s future dangerousness as a nonstatutory aggravating factor); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 543 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(finding that one purpose of capital punishment is the prevention of future crimes);
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 732–33 (Pa. 2015) (finding that the prosecutor
properly argued future dangerousness before the jury so that it could be considered as a nonstatutory aggravating factor); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1411–12 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the prosecution appropriately argued the defendant’s future dangerousness
before the jury in Georgia state court), vacated sub nom. Kemp v. Brooks, 478 U.S. 1016
(1986); Doster v. State, 72 So. 3d 50, 120–21 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (finding future
dangerousness “relevant and admissible in Alabama pursuant to § 13A–5–45(d), Ala. Code
1975”); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 252–53 (2002) (finding that the defendant’s
future dangerousness was at issue in the case and should have been considered); State v.
Robert, 820 N.W.2d 136, 143 (S.D. 2012) (finding that the circuit court’s conclusion “was
based on appropriate considerations including: [the defendant’s] future dangerousness”).
Pennsylvania and Georgia courts allow expert psychiatric testimony on defendants’ future
dangerousness following the Supreme Court’s holding in Barefoot v. Estelle. See United States
v. Williams, No. 4:08-cr-00070, 2013 WL 1335599, at *33 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) (refusing
to strike the future dangerousness factor on the basis that expert testimony is inaccurate);
Pitts v. State, 386 S.E.2d 351, 357 (Ga. 1989) (“Expert testimony concerning a defendant’s
future dangerousness is not, as the defendant contends, constitutionally barred.” (citing
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983))). California allows prosecutorial argument regarding
a capital defendant’s future dangerousness if it is based on evidence of a defendant’s conduct
rather than expert opinion. See People v. Thomas, 256 P.3d 603, 622 (Cal. 2011)
(“Prosecutorial argument regarding a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is permissible
if, as here, it is based on evidence of the defendant’s conduct rather than expert opinion.”).
The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted the aggravating factor of a previous violent
felony as incorporating a defendant’s propensity for a violent future. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 54-604(3) (2021) (“The person previously committed another felony, an element of which was
the use or threat of violence to another person or the creation of a substantial risk of death
or serious physical injury to another person . . . .”); Williams v. State, 991 S.W.2d 565, 576
(Ark. 1999) (“[I]t is evident that the purpose of this aggravating circumstance is not simply
to show the defendant’s violent history, as appellant contends, but it is also intended to show
the defendant’s propensity for a violent future.”). Utah and North Carolina have allowed for
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dangerousness is thus only required or permitted in twenty states
and the federal courts, it plays the majority role in the
administration of the death penalty. As Dorland and Krauss
explained, “Only six states explicitly list future dangerousness as a
primary statutory criteri[on]. Yet, these states represent over half
of all executions that have occurred since the Furman decision.”64
C. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS BY THE NUMBERS

Stark statistics reflect the outsized national importance of future
dangerousness inquiries in death penalty proceedings.65 Of the
1,535 total executions carried out since 1976, all but 141 have been
carried out in jurisdictions where juries were permitted to consider
future dangerousness as part of their sentencing determinations.66
And in more than half of those executions, there were specific
legislative provisions for considering future dangerousness or a
requirement that it be considered.67 Notably, zooming in on Texas,
the imposition of death to be based on a defendant’s future dangerousness. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(b) (2021) (“Any evidence the court considers to have probative force may
be received regardless of its admissibility . . . .”); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 353 (Utah
1993) (“A jury may legitimately consider a defendant’s character, future dangerousness, lack
of remorse, and retribution in the penalty phase hearing.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3)
(2021) (stating that evidence “may include matters relating to any of the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances” otherwise listed in the statute); State v. Smith, 607 S.E.2d 607,
621 (N.C. 2005) (stating that “a prosecutor may urge the jury to reach a death sentence based
on a fear of the defendant’s future dangerousness” (citing State v. Cummings, 536 S.E.2d 36,
55 (N.C. 2000))).
64 Dorland & Krauss, supra note 10, at 66 (footnote omitted).
65 See Mark D. Cunningham, Jon R. Sorensen & Thomas J. Reidy, Capital Jury DecisionMaking: The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence, 15 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 223, 225
(2009) (stating that “[j]ury anticipation of future violence by a capital defendant played a role
in a substantial proportion of the 1158 executions carried out in the United States between
1976 and April 2009” and “in seventy-seven per cent of the federal capital prosecutions from
1995 to 2006”).
66 Executions by State and Region Since 1976, supra note 19. The total number of such
executions in the twenty states listed in Table 1, infra, is 1,394. Execution Database, DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
[hereinafter
DPIC
Execution
Database],
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution-database (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
67 There were 806 executions in the following six states, all of which have statutory
provisions allowing future dangerousness to be considered: Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma,
Wyoming, Idaho, and Oregon. DPIC Execution Database (selecting the aforementioned six
states); see supra notes 55–60.
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the state where it all started, “[f]uture dangerousness findings have
played a dispositive role in each of the more than 550 executions in
Texas . . . since Furman.”68
The massive importance of future dangerousness extends to the
current death row as well. As of October 2020, of the 2,557 people
on death row in both the state and federal systems, 2,353 (or 92%)
are from jurisdictions where juries were permitted to consider
future dangerousness as part of their sentencing determinations.69
Focusing in on the federal death penalty in isolation provides
similar clarity as to the importance of future dangerousness: of the
538 cases in which the United States Attorney General has
authorized federal capital prosecutions,70 374 have featured
defendants who faced an allegation of future dangerousness as a
non-statutory aggravating circumstance.71
Table 1 lists the jurisdictions that either statutorily require
consideration of future dangerousness (such as Texas72), provide by
statute that future dangerousness is an aggravating factor, or
permit future dangerousness testimony in a range of circumstances.

68 Marah Stith McLeod, The Death Penalty as Incapacitation, 104 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1140
(2018) (emphasis added).
69 Death Row Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. [hereinafter DPIC Death Row
Database], https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview (last visited Feb. 18, 2021)
(providing death row information as of October 1, 2020). See infra Table 1 (listing which states
consider future dangerousness). And there were, as of October 1, 2020, 290 people on death
row from jurisdictions with specific statutory provisions for considering future dangerousness
or a requirement that it be considered: these states are Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Wyoming,
Idaho, and Oregon. DPIC Death Row Database, supra.
70 Declaration of G. Ben Cohen Regarding Federal Death Penalty Cases Involving
Allegations of Future Dangerousness ¶ 5 (Jan. 28, 2021) [hereinafter Declaration of G. Ben
Cohen],
https://fdprc.capdefnet.org/sites/cdn_fdprc/files/Assets/public/project_declarations/future_da
ngerousness/future_danger_alleged_as_aggravator_in_notice_of_intent_january_2021.pdf.
These statistics are from cases for which information regarding whether future danger was
alleged could be located. According to the author of the declaration setting forth these
statistics, information could not be located for twenty-five defendants. Id.
71 Id.
72 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Jurisdiction
Texas
Oregon
Virginia
Idaho
Oklahoma
Wyoming
Alabama

California

Georgia

Louisiana

Missouri

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

Table 173
Use of Future
Dangerousness
Statutory
Requirement
Statutory
Requirement
Statutory
Permitted
Statutory
Aggravating Factor
Statutory
Aggravating Factor
Statutory
Aggravating Factor
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness

[Vol. 56:225

#
On #
Death
Executions
Row
210
576
24

2

2

114

8

3

45

113

1

1

170

67

711

13

45

77

68

28

22

93

73 These numbers were drawn from DPIC Death Row Database, supra note 69, and DPIC
Execution Database, supra note 66, on February 18, 2021, reflecting statistics last updated
on October 1, 2020.
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Montana

Nevada

North Carolina

Ohio

Pennsylvania

South Carolina

Utah

Arizona
Florida
Federal

DEADLY “TOXINS”

Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Permit Future
Dangerousness
Evidence or
Argument
Rebuttal
Rebuttal
Non-Statutory
Aggravating Factor

249

2

3

70

12

141

43

141

56

142

3

39

43

7

7

119
347
55

38
99
16

D. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS IN THE HANDS OF THE JURY

Future dangerousness not only plays a prominent role as a major
engine of the American death penalty when considering large-scale
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execution, charging, and death row statistics in the aggregate but
also functions as a powerful factor when considering the fairness of
each trial in which it is alleged. In such a context where the life or
death of a particular defendant depends upon a jury’s predictive
accuracy, future dangerousness testimony is perhaps so powerful
that it risks obfuscating the very constitutional purpose that the
Court has used to uphold it.74
As Professor William Berry III has explained,
While the rationales of retribution and general
deterrence tend to permeate the public’s understanding
of the justification for the state’s use of the death
penalty against its citizens, a closer examination of the
various capital schemes employed by death penalty
jurisdictions quickly reveals that dangerousness is in
fact the primary determinant in the sentencing
process.75
As other commentators have noted, jurors’ assessments of future
dangerousness are “highly subjective” at best.76 Jurors overestimate
risks of future violence, recidivism, and release.77 As William
Bowers and Benjamin Steiner summarized, “Judging a person’s
likely future dangerousness is far from foolproof; indeed, those who
have examined such assessments find that they are often unreliable
74 See Ana M. Otero, The Death of Fairness: Texas’s Future Dangerousness Revisited, 4 U.
DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (explaining that even though future dangerousness has been
criticized for being based on “unreliable and faulty scientific evidence,” it is the “touchstone
of the death sentence” in Texas). Commentators also have noted that the rise of life without
parole sentencing—which cabins the jury’s consideration of future dangerousness—has been
one of the key state-law changes that explains the dramatic decline in death sentencing. See
Ankur Desai & Brandon L. Garrett, The State of the Death Penalty, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1255, 1259 (2019) (“[A] possible explanation for the decline in death sentencing may be the
rise of an alternative sentence: life without parole.”).
75 William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition
of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 893 (2010).
76 Jonathan R. Sorenson & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence
Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1254 (2000).
77 See id. at 1254–55 (“Several factors in the decision-making process encourage jurors to
overestimate the threat of violence posed by capital murderers. . . . [J]urors seldom realize
research has consistently found the true incidence of recidivism among murderers released
from prison to be much lower than for other types of parolees.”).
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because they are subject especially to ‘false positives’ or predictions
of dangerousness that do not materialize.”78 Not only are future
dangerousness assessments often unreliable; they also often result
in the sentencing to death—and execution—of the least culpable
defendants.79
To this end, the Capital Jury Project’s interviews with hundreds
of capital jurors found that in the eyes of the jurors who sit on death
penalty cases, future dangerousness allegations play a remarkably
weighty role in jury decision making.80 “A theme present in a
number of early pro-death jurors’ accounts is the perception of likely
future dangerousness of the defendant—the likelihood that ‘he
could do something like that again’ . . . .”81
If future dangerousness allegations reliably trigger the fear of a
jury—and nearly always result in a jury finding of future
dangerousness—it could be an indicator that the supposed
individualized life and death determination prized by the Court in
Jurek may actually be more reminiscent of a Furman-like arbitrary
system of justice that comes down to whether a particular
prosecutor chooses to allege future dangerousness. Supporting this
concern is a review of Texas cases that found that juries considered
defendants to be a future danger in 110 of the 115 reviewed cases.82
78 William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical
Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 667
(1999).
79 See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 168 (“[F]uture dangerousness manages to simultaneously
undermine the retributive rationale for the executions it supports and trap many of the leastculpable capital defendants.”).
80 The Capital Jury Project was initiated by William J. Bowers and is one of the largest
empirical assessments of jurors’ decision-making in death penalty determinations. See
Capital Jury Project, 1941–2011, M.E. GRENANDER DEP’T OF SPECIAL COLLECTIONS &
ARCHIVES, https://archives.albany.edu/description/catalog/apap196#summary (last visited
Dec. 17, 2021). The research involved “over 1,200 interviews from jurors in 353 capital trials
in 14 states.” Id.; see also William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1088 (1995) (discussing survey results in which
“[j]urors were evidently concerned with the defendant’s future dangerousness” and
“deliberations focused on” the future dangerousness “topic[] a ‘great deal’ or a ‘fair amount’”).
81 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in
Capital Sentencing: Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1500 (1998).
82 See Scott Phillips & Trent Steidley, A Systematic Lottery: The Texas Death Penalty, 1976
to 2016, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1041, 1055 n.55 (2020) (“Phillips examined the cases
of 504 defendants who were indicted for capital murder in Houston from 1992 to 1999. The
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Similarly, a study of Virginia death sentences found jurors to be
“preoccupied” with the defendant’s future dangerousness when they
deliberated about the defendant’s fate.83 Capital Jury Project
research in South Carolina found that “[f]uture dangerousness
appears to be one of the primary determinants of capital-sentencing
outcomes, and it also appears to be one of the few ways in which
white jurors and black jurors think differently about aggravation
and mitigation.”84
E. RACE, ETHNICITY, AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS

Adding to the concern of the arbitrariness and lack of
individuation is data indicating that future dangerousness
determinations may be systematically tied to race and ethnicity.85
Black and Latino defendants stand out. According to our research
on race in the federal death penalty, of the 538 cases authorized by
the Attorney General, only 28% of the defendants have been White.
Two hundred sixty-two (49%) of the defendants have been Black,
ninety-nine (18%) have been Latino, and twenty-nine (5%) have
been other minorities. We found that over the course of the federal
death penalty’s operation, future dangerousness has been alleged
District Attorney sought death in 129 cases and 117 cases advanced to a penalty trial. Phillips
had data on whether the jury concluded that the defendant was a future danger in 115 of the
117 cases in question. The jury decided the defendant was indeed a future danger in 96% of
the cases (110/115) . . . .” (citing Paul Colomy & Scott Phillips, Irremedial Work and ActPerson Merger: Constructing Irredeemable Selves in Death Penalty Trials, 33 SOCIO. F. 783,
798–99 (2018))).
83 Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia’s Capital Jurors, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2063, 2067 (2003) (“South Carolina jurors are preoccupied with the defendant’s future
dangerousness when they deliberate about his fate, but Virginia jurors are, if anything, even
more preoccupied.”).
84 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559–60 (1998) (“When the question of the defendant’s
future dangerousness was put more directly—the ‘defendant might be a danger to society in
the future’—57.9% reported that they would be more likely to vote for death. Moreover, 78.7%
believed the defendant actually presented such a risk. These results comport with prior
studies that emphasize the pervasive role future dangerousness plays in and on the minds of
capital sentencing jurors.” (footnotes omitted)).
85 One of this Article’s authors, G. Ben Cohen, reviewed and compiled this data in the
normal course of business while serving as Resource Counsel with the Federal Death Penalty
Resource Counsel Project.
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against Latino defendants at a disproportionate rate—higher than
against Black, White, and other minority defendants. For example,
prosecutors alleged future dangerousness against eighty of the
ninety-nine (81%) Latino defendants authorized for the federal
death penalty.86 More specifically, 95% of the Latino defendants
authorized for death penalty sentences faced an allegation of future
dangerousness in the decade and a half since the departure of
Attorney General Gonzalez in September 2007.87
If future dangerousness allegations are made disproportionately
against non-White defendants, and these same future
dangerousness allegations drive death sentences as we have
described, this connection between race and future dangerousness
leads to an intolerable injustice. In Part III, we explore research on
some of the psychological and cognitive levers that may be
underlying prosecutor, judge, and juror associations between future
dangerousness and Black and Latino defendants.

III. INVESTIGATING IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT BIAS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The law’s surprisingly heavy reliance on future dangerousness
determinations in capital cases, contextualized within historically
unrelenting racial disparities in the death penalty—including the
disproportionate use of future dangerousness allegations against
non-White defendants facing the federal death penalty—
necessitates a targeted empirical examination of whether future
dangerousness standards act as a predictable and biasing racial
toxin in capital cases. Fortunately, the development of implicit and
explicit bias-focused study methodologies in the social and cognitive
sciences allows for unique and targeted study designs to be
developed. This Part presents modern research connecting race and
ethnicity to automatic stereotypes of dangerousness and examines
the ways in which empirical studies have begun to investigate

86 An allegation of future dangerousness has only been made in 294 of the other 439 cases
(67%).
87 See Richard B. Schmitt, Alberto Gonzales Resigns as AG, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2007,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gonzales28aug28-story.html (discussing
Gonzales’s resignation, effective September 17, 2007).
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racializing toxins in the criminal legal system generally, as well as
in the capital context more specifically. Connecting these
discourses, this review sets the stage for our national empirical
study on racial bias and future dangerousness.
A. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF RACE, BIAS, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Racial bias has plagued the administration of America’s
experiment with capital punishment since its inception.88 Even
before David Baldus’s landmark empirical study demonstrating the
influence of race on the administration of Georgia’s death penalty
(Baldus study),89 the interconnection between race and American
capital punishment was inexorably linked.90 Yet, the
groundbreaking Baldus study illuminated the undeniability of a
racialized system of punishment.91 Nonetheless, the Baldus study
was met with judicial indifference.92 Ultimately, when confronted
88 See BANNER, supra note 6, at 8 (describing “the swelling number of capital statutes
applicable only to blacks” in American colonies in the early eighteenth century); FROM LYNCH
MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE, supra note 6, at 1 (describing “the connection between race and
the killings of African-Americans, in particular through lynchings and the death penalty” as
“widely recognized among scholars, activists, and legal officials”); KENNEDY, supra note 6, at
xii (noting the debate over “evidence suggesting that, in a substantial number of instances,
age-old racial habits assert themselves in the process of condemning certain criminals to
death”).
89 See generally David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative
Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim L. &
Criminology 661 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus et al., An Empirical Study of the Georgia
Experience].
90 See BANNER, supra note 6, at 8 (demonstrating that the link between race and capital
punishment in America dates back to the early eighteenth century); see also GROSS & MAURO,
supra note 6, at 8–9 (discussing empirical studies of racial discrimination in capital
sentencing).
91 See Baldus et al., An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, supra note 89, at 709–
10 (“[O]ur data strongly suggests that Georgia is operating a dual system, based upon the
race of the victim, for processing homicide cases. Georgia juries appear to tolerate greater
levels of aggravation without imposing the death penalty in black victim cases; and, as
compared to white victim cases, the level of aggravation in black victim cases must be
substantially greater before the prosecutor will even seek a death sentence.” (footnote
omitted)).
92 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294–95 (1987) (rejecting the use of statistics to
prove race discrimination because “[e]ach jury is unique in its composition, and the
Constitution requires . . . consideration of innumerable factors”; “[t]hus, the application of an
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with evidence that “blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at
nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7
times the rate of whites who kill blacks,”93 the Supreme Court
expressed an “unwillingness to regard petitioner’s evidence as
sufficient . . . based in part on the fear that recognition of
McCleskey’s claim would open the door to widespread challenges to
all aspects of criminal sentencing.”94 Justice Brennan described this
as “a fear of too much justice.”95
After McCleskey, a series of empirical studies demonstrated
results in myriad jurisdictions consistent with the landmark Baldus
study96—none of which achieved any support in the courts.97 Part of
inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing
simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general statistics to a
specific venire-selection or Title VII case”).
93 Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 339.
95 Id.
96 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (describing the findings of “a study of equal justice
in death sentencing during the fifteen-year period” between Furman and McCleskey); GROSS
& MAURO, supra note 6, at 69 (“Multiple logistic regression . . . analysis reveals large and
statistically significant race-of-victim effects on capital sentencing in Georgia, Florida, and
Illinois.”); see also David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2004) (explaining that empirical evidence from research proved
“that race-of-victim discrimination” “appears to characterize many, but not all” capital
punishment systems after Furman); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical
Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 208–09
(2003) (discussing sentencing disparities influenced by race); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F.
Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976–1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 17, 25, 27 (1995) (finding that in Kentucky from 1976–1991, “Blacks who killed Whites”
were more likely to face capital charges and were “more likely to be sentenced to die by the
jury”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990) (finding “a pattern of evidence indicating
racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty after the
Furman decision”).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864 (per curiam) (2002) (holding that a
defendant was not entitled to discovery regarding the state’s capital punishment practices
because “raw statistics regarding overall charges” were not relevant to the decision); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 178, 180 (2007) (noting that after McCleskey, courts have almost universally rejected
narrowly tailored and focused statistical challenges to race prosecution). Even in cases where
statistics reflect overwhelming race discrimination at the county (as opposed to state) level,
claims have been unsuccessful unless race is specifically identified (and proven) as a reason

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

31

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

256

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:225

the challenge is that many of these studies found results that could
not overcome what Justice Scalia predicted and acknowledged in
the memoranda he circulated at the time of the McCleskey case:
“Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions
and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the
decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that
all I need is more proof.”98
Justice Scalia’s then-observation now seems impressive in its
ability to predict the impact of “unconscious” bias on case outcomes
despite the lack of evidence at that time, when modern empirical
methods of testing implicit bias were in early development.99 In

for prosecution. Id. at 181–84. Ultimately, the focus of the Court has been on intentionality
rather than statistics, but even in the most outrageous of cases, the Court has held its nose
and permitted executions. See Wellons v. Hall, 558 U.S. 220, 221, 226 (2010) (per curiam)
(remanding for further hearings but ultimately permitting execution regardless of allegations
that some jurors gave chocolate shaped as male genitalia to the trial judge and chocolate
shaped as female breasts to the bailiff); see also Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911, 911 (2019)
(Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (denying certiorari even where
“Tharpe, who is black, has asked state and federal courts to consider his claim that a white
member of the jury that sentenced him to death was biased against him because of his race”);
id. (“Tharpe has presented a signed affidavit from the juror in question, who stated, among
other things, that ‘there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers,’ and that
Tharpe, ‘who wasn’t in the “good” black folks category in [his] book, should get the electric
chair for what he did.’ . . . Nevertheless, Tharpe has never received a hearing on the merits
of his racial-bias claim.” (alteration in original) (quoting Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 546
(2018) (per curiam))).
98 David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Reflections on the
“Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of its
Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 371 n.46 (1994)
[hereinafter Baldus et al., Reflections] (quoting Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, J., U.S.
Sup. Ct., to the Conf. of the Js., U.S. Sup. Ct. 1 (Jan. 6, 1987) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review)).
99 These methods included priming and the development of the Implicit Association Test.
See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 5, 8–9 (1989) (explaining the studies that
examined “automatic stereotype priming effects”); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4,
6 (1995) [hereinafter Greenwald & Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition] (discussing how
“priming” and “context” affect empirical studies); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee
& Jordan L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464 (1998) [hereinafter
Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences] (defining Implicit Association Tests).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/5

32

Levinson et al.: Deadly 'Toxins'

2021]

DEADLY “TOXINS”

257

today’s world of social science methodology, it is now possible to
observe that the empirical studies demonstrating overarching racial
bias in the administration of America’s capital punishment (which,
at the time, were indeed groundbreaking and continue to provide
valuable and striking confirmation of the modern continuation of a
historical problem) were not methodologically able to identify the
precise locations where racial bias taints the system.100 Today, these
methods can potentially uncover specific and identifiably
problematic legal inquiries and processes that, if addressed, would
hardly be considered what Justice Scalia deemed “ineradicable.”101
B. STUDIES OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT

Research, including our own prior scholarship, not only has
sought to examine racial bias and case outcomes generally but also
has attempted to focus on particularly troubling spots within the
administration of the criminal justice system, including specific
processes in death penalty cases.102 In particular, and as we will
summarize in more detail, our colleagues and members of our
research team have empirically tested the role of racial bias in death

Former federal prosecutor, now Professor, Rory Little, considered the compelling
statistics presented by Kevin McNally that race played a role in the administration of the
federal death penalty and suggested that “unconscious empathic bias cannot be identified
and corrected by the unconscious individual actors.” Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors
Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter
of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1592, 1602 (2004) (citing Kevin McNally, Race
and Federal Death Penalty: A Nonexistent Problem Gets Worse, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1615
(2004)). Professor Little concluded that “[i]nstitutional responses are necessary to eliminate,
or correct for, such unconscious influences.” Id. at 1602. He suggested that “the unconscious
ethnic biases that all persons, of all races, may hold” and “unconscious race empathy . . .
might well explain why close potential capital cases—cases that I might colloquially call
‘leaners’ and Professor Baldus describes as ‘mid-range’ cases in terms of culpability—might
go more often against minority defendants.” Id. at 1599–1600 (footnote omitted). Little’s
identification of “leaners,” perhaps considered within the role of prosecutorial discretion, may
help to illuminate the various pathways whereby precise legal rules, standards, or processes
are tested.
101 See Baldus et al., Reflections, supra note 98, at 371 n.46 (quoting Memorandum from
Antonin Scalia, J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to the Conf. of the Js., U.S. Sup. Ct. 1 (Jan. 6, 1987) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
102 See infra notes 103–108.
100
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qualification,103 the presumption of innocence,104 the evaluation of
ambiguous evidence,105 the way jurors and judges remember (and
misremember) case facts,106 the way judges sentence,107 and capital
punishment’s retributive norms.108 Taken together, the results of
these studies support broader arguments, such as Levinson and
Smith’s claim of “systemic implicit bias”—the idea that “a
comprehensive understanding of implicit bias in the criminal justice
system requires acknowledging that the theoretical underpinnings
of the entire system may now be culturally and cognitively
inseparable from implicit bias.”109
These studies also help to focus more on the specific ways bias
can operate and can potentially explain some of the “how and why”
behind general results like the Baldus studies. At the same time,
they help motivate the empirical examination of specific inquiries,
such as the future dangerousness prediction in capital cases.
Although not every process or procedure may lead to identifiably
intolerable racialized harms within a system, such as the system of
capital punishment, it is nonetheless not particularly hard to
identify and test specific hypotheses whereby certain elements of
the criminal justice system may lead to predictably racialized
103 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Koichi Hioki, Race and Retribution:
An Empirical Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839
(2019) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Race and Retribution]; Justin D. Levinson, Robert J.
Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on
Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2014) [hereinafter
Levinson et al., Devaluing Death].
104 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit
Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187
(2010) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias].
105 See generally Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone,
Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010).
106 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality].
107 See generally Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit
Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2017)
[hereinafter Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias]; Mark W. Bennett, Justin D. Levison &
Koichi Hioki, Judging Federal White-Collar Fraud Sentencing: An Empirical Study Revealing
the Need for Further Reform, 102 IOWA L. REV. 939 (2017).
108 See generally Levinson et al., Race and Retribution, supra note 103.
109 Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J.F. 406, 407
(2017).
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harms. Much as we set forth this Article’s study of racial bias and
future dangerousness in Part IV, the studies described here
demonstrate how focusing in on certain elements of the legal process
may help illuminate legally-sanctioned “toxins” and pave the way
toward just solutions.
Of the various ways that researchers have been able to examine
specific hypotheses related to race and criminal justice, some of the
most revealing have included the creation of specifically tailored
Implicit Association Tests or priming mechanisms.110 These
measures are designed to investigate particular hypotheses within
the criminal justice system. Perhaps the most well-known method
of measuring automatic associations is the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). The IAT is a game-like measure that pairs an “attitude
object” (such as a particular group, e.g., women or Muslim
Americans) with an “evaluative dimension” (positive or negative)
and tests how the speed (measured in milliseconds) and accuracy of
participants’ responses indicate automatic associations between
concepts.111 Study participants sit at a keyboard (frequently at their
own computer) and are instructed to match an attitude object (e.g.,
Muslim or Christian, woman or man) with either an evaluative
dimension (e.g., positive or negative) or an attribute dimension (e.g.,
moral or immoral, valuable or worthless) by pressing a designated
response key as quickly as possible.112 For example, in one task,
participants are instructed to press a key (e.g., “E”) when a Muslim
110 “Priming is a term imported from cognitive psychology that describes a stimulus that
has an effect on an unrelated task. . . . Simply put, priming studies show how causing someone
to think about a particular domain can trigger asscociative networks related to that domain.”
Justin D. Levinson, Danielle M. Young & Laurie A. Rudman, Implicit Racial Bias: A Social
Science Overview, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 9, 10 (Justin D. Levinson &
Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) [hereinafter Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview] (first
citing Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 106; and then citing Justin D.
Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (2009)); see also
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 106, at 356–58 (describing priming studies
that demonstrated “shooter bias” in which the participants were more likely to “shoot Black
perpetrators more quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators” in a video game
instructing participants “to shoot perpetrators . . . as fast as they can”).
111 This description of the IAT in this paragraph and the next is derived heavily from our
prior description of it. See Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 110, at 10–
15.
112 See Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 99, at 1466
(discussing the IAT keyboard procedure).
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name or a positive word appears on the screen. In a second task,
participants are instructed to press a key (e.g., “I”) when a Christian
name or negative word appears. The strength of the attitude is
understood as the variance in the speed at which people can respond
to the two tasks.113 For example, if participants pair the words in
the first task faster than those in the second task, then they are
demonstrating implicitly positive attitudes toward Muslims. If they,
however, are faster to respond to tasks that require categorizing
Muslims with negative words than tasks that require categorizing
Muslims with positive words, then they are demonstrating implicit
religion-based stereotyping.114
Levinson’s scholarship has relied upon both IATs and other
priming methodologies. Using a priming methodology, Levinson
and psychologist Danielle Young tested whether “priming mock
jurors with the image of a dark-skinned perpetrator might alter
judgments about the probative value of evidence.”115 Although the
study did not measure dangerousness explicitly, its context was an
armed robbery case.116 Participants read the basic story of the
robbery and viewed five crime scene photos for four seconds each.117
All participants viewed identical photos, excluding one dimension:
half saw a photo of a darker-skinned perpetrator, and the other half

Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 110, at 17 (explaining “strength
of attitude”).
114 Social scientists Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald have accurately
summarized the logic underlying the IAT: “When highly associated targets and attributes
share the same response key, participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas
when weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key, participants
tend to classify them more slowly and with greater difficulty.” Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony
G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 800, 803
(2001). Social psychologists Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore concur: “The ingeniously
simple concept underlying the IAT is that tasks are performed well when they rely on wellpracticed associations between objects and attributes.” Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D.
Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GRP. PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP RELS. 359, 359 (2007).
115 Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 110, at 22 (discussing Levinson
& Young, supra note 105); see also Levinson & Young, supra note 105, at 310–11 (describing
a study that provided “identical photos except in one key respect,” the color of the
perpetrator’s skin, and found discrepancies based on differing skin tones).
116 Levinson & Young, supra note 105, at 332.
117 Id.
113
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saw a photo of a lighter-skinned perpetrator.118 Mock jurors then
learned about various pieces of evidence from trial and were asked
to rate the probative value of each piece of evidence.119 The study
results found that jurors who saw a darker skinned perpetrator
evaluated evidence as tending to indicate guilt, a result that
demonstrated how simply priming skin tone or race can potentially
affect the way jurors evaluate key case facts and defendants.120
In a different study, Levinson used racialized names and a
memory test to evaluate whether jurors automatically
misremember case facts (of a violent assault case) in racially biased
ways.121 When case facts are consistent with jurors’ explicit or
implicit racial stereotypes—for example, the stereotype that Black
people are aggressive—it was hypothesized that study participants
would more accurately remember facts that are consistent with
these stereotypes.122 Levinson thus conducted a study designed to
examine whether people misremember stereotype-consistent case
facts in racially biased ways.123 Results of the study indicated that
participants who read about a Black actor remembered that actor’s
aggressive actions more frequently than participants who read
about a White actor, even though the White actor had committed
the same aggressions.124 Though a memory study is perhaps the
converse of a predictive study, the study provides an insightful link
into how racialized cognitive processes can affect the ways jurors
understand cases and defendants.
In another study focusing on jury decision-making and implicit
racial bias, Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Young designed an IAT
specifically to test whether implicit racial bias is associated with the

Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 332–34.
120 Id. at 310–11, 337 (“Participants who saw the photo of the perpetrator with a dark skin
tone judged ambiguous evidence to be significantly more indicative of guilt than participants
who saw the photo of a perpetrator with a lighter skin tone.” (footnote omitted)).
121 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 106, at 347, 353 (providing the
hypothetical used and arguing “that implicit racial bias automatically causes jurors (and
perhaps even judges) to misremember case facts in racially biased ways” (footnote omitted)).
122 Id. at 397.
123 Id. at 352–53, 380–81 (showing a study that draws on “cognitive science studies that
show the fragility of the human memory and connect memory failures to racial biases”).
124 Id. at 398–99.
118
119
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presumption of innocence.125 The researchers devised an IAT that
measured whether people associate White or Black with the legal
concepts of Guilty and Not Guilty.126 The results of the study
demonstrated that participants held a significant implicit
association between Black individuals and Guilty compared to
White individuals and Guilty, indicating that the presumption of
innocence may not cognitively function to protect Black men.127 The
study thus provided a model of the way IATs can be specifically
developed to test racialized associations in the criminal justice
context.128
Building upon these studies, researchers began using implicit
and explicit bias methodologies to examine racial bias in capital
punishment.129 For example, Levinson, Smith, and Young studied
the implicit and explicit biases of jury-eligible citizens in six leading
death penalty states.130 The study focused first on whether jurors
harbor implicit racial biases related to the value of human life, such
that jurors automatically associate White with concepts of value
and Black with lack of worth.131 The study results supported that
prediction; indeed, jurors implicitly associated White with worth
and Black with worthless.132 In addition, the research project also
focused in on the role of implicit and explicit bias in the process of
capital punishment’s “death qualification” process whereby jurors
in the venire are screened for their willingness to potentially impose

125 See Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 104, at 204 (“The results
of the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT confirmed our hypothesis that there is an implicit racial bias in
the presumption of innocence.”).
126 See id. at 201–03 (discussing the study’s IAT method).
127 See id. at 204 (“These results suggest that participants held an implicit association
between Black and Guilty.”).
128 Id. at 189.
129 See infra notes 130, 135.
130 See Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 103, at 553–56 (describing how the
authors measured the jurors’ implicit and explicit racial biases). For additional discussion of
implicit bias in the death penalty, see also Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Capital
Punishment: Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW,
supra note 110, at 229.
131 Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 103, at 537–38, 565.
132 See id. at 565 (explaining “that death-qualified participants more rapidly associate[d]
White subjects with the concepts of ‘worth’ or ‘value’ and Black subjects with the concepts of
‘worthless’ or ‘expendable’”).
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the death penalty.133 In that context, the study findings
demonstrated that death qualified jurors—the only jurors who
would be allowed to sit on a capital jury—actually possessed higher
levels of racial biases (both implicit and explicit) than jurors who
would be excluded from capital juries because they either would not
be able to convict or would never be able to vote for a death
sentence.134
Levinson, Smith, and Hioki continued the inquiry into bias and
the death penalty by measuring whether Americans’ automatic
conceptions of retributive punishment have become cognitively
inseparable from race.135 The experimenters recruited a diverse
133 As the authors explained, death qualification is a process that applies to capital cases.
See id. at 542 (“One particular form of regulation that applies solely to capital cases is the
death-qualification process.”); see also id. (“To be eligible [(death-qualified)] to sit on a capital
jury, a prospective juror must be willing to consider sentencing a defendant to both life
without the possibility of parole and the death penalty. . . . [N]o juror who would
automatically vote to reject (or to impose) the death penalty is eligible to sit on a capital
jury.”).
134 Id. at 521, 521 n.19 (“[W]e found—as predicted—that death-qualified jurors harbored
stronger racial biases than excluded jurors. These differences in racial bias levels were
revealed on both implicit and self-reported (explicit) measures.” (footnote omitted)). Young,
Levinson, and Scott Sinnett employed a priming methodology to follow up on this study by
examining the presumption of innocence and race. Danielle M. Young, Justin D. Levinson &
Scott Sinnett, Innocent Until Primed: Mock Jurors’ Racially Biased Response to the
Presumption of Innocence, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2014). In this study, mock jurors were seated
in groups of up to six in a moot courtroom. Id. at 2. The jurors were shown a video in which a
White United States District Court judge “read[] a series of jury instructions that either
included the presumption of innocence” instructions or unrelated instructions of similar
length. Id. Immediately after listening to the instructions, the mock jurors completed a study
method known as a “dot-probe task.” Id. at 2–3. This task involves quickly viewing four faces,
two Black and two White, which flash rapidly and then disappear from a screen. Id.
Immediately after the faces disappear, a gray dot appears in equal frequency behind one of
the two faces. Id. at 3. While still seated in the jury box, the mock jurors were instructed to
indicate, as quickly as possible, the side of the screen in which the dot appeared. Id. The
researchers found that the “[p]resumption of innocence instructions induced attentional bias.
Specifically, individuals presented with presumption of innocence instructions had faster
responses to Black, compared to White, faces in a dot-probe task.” Id. The results, considered
in connection with prior studies, could indicate that the presumption of innocence triggers
guilty stereotypes about Black men. See id. at 4 (recognizing that “the very instructions
designed to protect defendants from bias” might produce an implicitly biased response).
135 See Levinson et al., Race and Retribution, supra note 103, at 844, 854, 874–75 (proposing
that “the historical use of punishment in racialized ways has led to the cognitive
inseparability of race and retribution” and discussing the development and use of the
“Retribution IAT”).
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sample of over 500 American adults and created an IAT to test
whether people implicitly associate retributive concepts with Blacks
and leniency and mercy with Whites.136 The results of the study
demonstrated that jury-eligible citizens indeed automatically
associated Black faces with the words “punish,” “payback,” and
“revenge” and associated White faces with the words “forgive,”
“compassion,” and “redemption.”137 Furthermore, the researchers
added to their earlier study by examining whether the process of
death qualification was potentially a fraught one.138 Results of this
study corroborated earlier results and demonstrated that death
qualified jurors were indeed more likely to hold implicit and explicit
biases than those who would be excluded because of an
unwillingness to convict or sentence a defendant to death.139
C. STEREOTYPES OF DANGER: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE
MEASUREMENT OF BIAS

Contextualized within this research on implicit bias and the
criminal justice system, research from the fields of implicit social
cognition and social psychology supports the prediction that implicit
and explicit biases may plague future dangerousness
determinations in capital cases and beyond.140 Here, we briefly
review the ways in which social scientists have examined racial cues
and the notion of danger in studies mostly outside of the legal
system. Even though such studies are not situated within the
courtroom context—and, notably, do not require jurors to make
judgments of a particular capital defendant’s future
dangerousness—they provide important theoretical support for the
hypothesis that asking jurors to determine a defendant’s future
dangerousness may lead to biased results. Taken together, they
support the hypothesis that when people think about Black and
Latino men, they automatically think about danger and hostility.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 844, 874–75, 879.
138 See id. at 844–45 (summarizing findings that the process of death qualification actually
increases the likelihood that racial biases will be triggered).
139 See id. at 879–81 (finding that “the death qualification process actually excludes the
least biased citizens”).
140 See infra Sections III.C.1–2.
136
137
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1. Black Men and Stereotypes of Danger. There is no shortage of
compelling studies investigating the connection between Black men
and stereotypes of danger and hostility.141 In a classic study by
Patricia Devine that demonstrated how easily racial stereotypes can
be activated, participants watched a series of flashing words—
including racialized category words, such as “Blacks,” and words
that were stereotypically associated with Black Americans, such as
“athletic” and “poor.”142 Shortly thereafter, participants read about
a man engaging in various ambiguous behaviors—such as
withholding rent until the landlord made repairs—and were asked
to make judgments about the man.143 Participants who were primed
with more Black-stereotyped words judged the actor’s ambiguous
behavior as more hostile than participants who were primed with
fewer Black-stereotyped words.144 Devine concluded, “[T]he
automatic activation of the racial stereotype affects the . . .
interpretation of ambiguously hostile behaviors for both high- and
low-prejudice subjects.”145 Although traits such as “poor” and
“athletic” are unrelated to the trait of “hostility,” the stereotype
See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 889 (2004)
(discussing study results finding that “Black faces looked more criminal to police officers; the
more Black, the more criminal”); see also Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd
& Bernd Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1314, 1325 (2002)
(discussing study participants’ decisions to either shoot or not shoot targets and finding that
“the decision to fire on an armed target was facilitated when that target was African
American, whereas the decision not to shoot an unarmed target was facilitated when that
target was White”); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 181, 190
(2001) (finding “that the race of faces paired with objects does influence the perceptual
identification of weapons,” that the results of the study “showed that when time was
unlimited, Black primes facilitated the identification of guns, relative to White primes,” and
that “when response time was constrained, Black primes caused race-specific errors”); Mark
W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal and the Presumption of Dangerousness:
Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 773
(2018) (“The stereotyping of Blacks’ predisposition to crime and dangerousness is rooted in
the beliefs formed during slavery by Whites that Blacks were more animalistic than
human.”). Studies on Latino men are not as numerous.
142 Devine, supra note 99, at 9–11.
143 Id. at 10.
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id.
141
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congruence between the primed social category (Blacks) and the
trait of hostility actually made participants more likely to judge a
behavior as hostile.146 If simply flashing words like “Black” and
“basketball” can automatically elicit racial stereotypes of hostility
unbeknownst to a person, then certainly looking at a Black or
Latino defendant in a murder trial could be expected to do the same.
Later studies of priming and race have shown that stereotypes
connecting Black Americans to dangerousness are essentially ready
to be activated and can be triggered even by normal occurrences,
such as listening to music147 or, perhaps, sitting on a jury.
Participants in a study by Rudman and Lee, for example, listened
to either rap or pop music for thirteen minutes and were later asked
to make judgments about a person’s ambiguously hostile and sexist
actions.148 The researchers found that simply listening to rap music
for only a few minutes activated participants’ negative racial
stereotypes of Black Americans and specifically triggered racialized
conceptions of violence and danger.149 Furthermore, the researchers
found that rap music even led to elevated judgments of a fictional
person’s hostility when he had a Black-sounding name (but not
when he had a White-sounding name).150 This study further
demonstrates that racial stereotypes of danger can be easily and
automatically activated, with concerning results.151
146 See id. at 9, 12 (discussing why words seemingly unrelated to hostility could cause the
priming effect).
147 See Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of
Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 133,
138–39 (2002) (finding that “exposure to violent and misogynistic rap music had the
generalized effect of strengthening the association between Black men and negative
attributes”).
148 See id. at 135–36, 140 (describing the study’s methodology). Participants’ self-reported
(explicit) prejudice levels did not predict participants’ racialized judgments, indicating that
automatic biases can leak into people’s decision-making processes without their endorsement
or awareness. See id. at 145–46 (discussing the fact that “self-reported stereotyping” only
“weakly predicted” a participant’s racialized judgments).
149 See id. at 144–46 (finding that the results of the study showed direct evidence that “rap
music automatically activates negative Black stereotypes”).
150 See id. at 145 (finding that “primed subjects rated Kareem as more sexist, as well as
more hostile and less intelligent than Donald, and they did so irrespective of their prejudice
level”).
151 See id. at 138 (“In sum, these results are consistent with our expectation that rap music
would strengthen automatic associations between Blacks and negative attributes . . . .”).
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A similar study by researchers James Johnson, Sophie
Trawalter, and John Dovidio primed participants by playing
segments of either a violent or non-violent rap song, indicating that
the content of what one hears can actually have important effects
on later racialized decision-making.152 After listening to the music,
participants read stories of violent behavior (e.g., breaking car
windows) and were asked to make judgments about the cause of
those actions.153 Those who heard the violent rap music, compared
to other participants, judged a Black male’s, but not a White male’s,
aggressive behavior as caused by dispositional factors (e.g., a violent
personality) rather than situational factors (e.g., alcohol or stress
related to a break-up).154 When people make dispositional
attributions for criminal behavior, such as believing that a person
acted because of a violent character rather than a bad situation,
there are clear implications for capital-case sentencing and future
dangerousness determinations.
Research on racial stereotypes and danger has even implicated
the role of mass media in the context of the death penalty.155 Phillip
Goff and his colleagues conducted a Pennsylvania-focused study
that linked the number of animal references in media sources (in
particular, references related to “ape,” such as “brute,” “barbaric,”
“claw,” and “crawl,” among others) used to describe a crime and the
number of Black defendants who were sentenced to death.156
Although it was not a particularized focus of the study, it is notable
that Pennsylvania, which has 142 people on death row, indeed

152 James D. Johnson, Sophie Trawalter & John F. Dovidio, Converging Interracial
Consequences of Exposure to Violent Rap Music on Stereotypical Attributions of Blacks, 36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 233, 239–40, 245–49 (2000) (outlining the study’s methodology
and discussing its results).
153 Id. at 240–41.
154 Id. at 245 (“When compared to control participants and those exposed to nonviolent
Black artists, participants exposed to the violent rap music made more negative dispositional
attributions of violence to a Black, but not to White, target person.”).
155 Phillip Atiba Goff, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams & Matthew Christian
Jackson, Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and
Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 292, 304 (2008) (“[W]e
demonstrated that subtle media representations of Blacks as apelike are associated with jury
decisions to execute black defendants.”).
156 Id. at 292, 303–04, 304 n.5 (describing the archival study of twenty years of capital cases
in Pennsylvania).
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allows for future dangerousness testimony.157 In the study, the
researchers reviewed newspaper coverage of murder cases in the
Philadelphia area from 1979 to 1999.158 Employing a coding
methodology, they compared the number of times “bestial or
subhuman” references were made in Philadelphia Inquirer articles
related to death-penalty cases and compared references for Black
defendants versus White defendants.159 As they hypothesized, the
number of “ape-relevant” words used in cases with Black defendants
(approximately 8.5 mentions per article) was significantly higher
than in cases with White defendants (approximately 2.2 mentions
per article).160 Interestingly, the researchers also found a direct
relationship between the articles’ “bestial or subhuman” content
and the trial outcome: Black defendants who were sentenced to
death were portrayed with a greater number of ape-like
representations in articles than Black defendants who received
sentences of less than death.161 This study powerfully demonstrates
that even supposedly race-neutral portrayals of capital crimes
incorporate harmful racial stereotypes of Black defendants and that
these racialized portrayals may actually influence trial outcomes.162
2. Latino Men and Stereotypes of Danger. Although research
projects investigating stereotypes of the Latinx community have
been somewhat less abundant, there have indeed been empirical
examinations that link Latinx stereotypes with conceptions of

See supra Table 1.
Goff et al., supra note 155, at 303 (“[W]e examined death-eligible cases between 1979
and 1999 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania . . . [and] extracted 153 cases for which we had both
mug shots of the defendant and press coverage of the case in the Philadelphia Inquirer.”).
159 Id. at 303–04.
160 Id. at 304.
161 Id. The researchers did not investigate how many of the death sentences included future
dangerousness testimony. See also Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. PurdieVaughns & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 383, 383–84 (2006) (finding
that in capital cases with White victims in Philadelphia, Black defendants who looked
stereotypically Black were more likely to receive the death penalty than Black defendants
who looked less stereotypically Black).
162 Cf. Goff et al., supra note 155, at 304 (“[D]espite the fact that we controlled for a
substantial number of factors that are known to influence criminal sentencing, these apelike
representations were associated with the most profound outcome of intergroup
dehumanization: death.”).
157
158
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hostility and aggression.163 A 2017 study by Melody Sadler, Joshua
Correll, Bernadette Park, and Charles Judd (Sadler and colleagues)
employed the classic “shooter bias” paradigm and measured
automatic responses in a way that illuminates the automaticity of
stereotypes of Latino danger.164 As demonstrated in a 2015 study,
in the video-game-style shooter bias paradigm, someone arrives on
“screen holding either a cell phone or a gun. Participants are
instructed to ‘shoot’ as rapidly as possible if the person is holding a
gun or to hit the safety (i.e. ‘not shoot’) as rapidly as possible if the
person is holding a cell phone.”165 In the classic shooter-bias studies,
researchers have found that people shoot more rapidly when they
see a Black person holding a gun compared to a White person
holding a gun.166 Similarly, participants are more likely to “shoot”
unarmed Black men than unarmed White men.167 When expanding
the “shooter bias” paradigm to include images of Latino men in a
study of actual police officers, Sadler and colleagues found that
study participants indeed “shot” Black and Latino men significantly
faster than White and Asian men.168 Furthermore, they found that
the quicker reaction times to shoot Latino men were associated with
police officers’ danger- and aggression-related stereotypes of
See infra notes 164, 171–173.
Melody S. Sadler, Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, The World Is
Not Black and White: Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot in a Multiethnic Context, 68 J. SOC.
ISSUES 286, 289–92 (2012) (“The current research examined implicit racial bias in the
decision to shoot White, Black, Latino, and Asian male targets in a FPS task in two studies.”).
165 Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the
Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 883 (2015) (footnote omitted).
166 See, e.g., Correll et al., supra note 141, at 1325 (finding that “[b]oth in speed and
accuracy, the decision to fire on an armed target was facilitated when that target was African
American”); see also Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1006, 1013 (2007)
(finding that participants reacted more quickly in the decision to shoot when the shooting
targets “were Black, rather than White”); Charles M. Judd, Irene V. Blair & Kristine M.
Chapleau, Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting out the Possibilities in the
Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 75, 78–79 (2004) (finding
that responses to categorize an object in a photograph as a gun were faster when the
participants had seen Black face primes than White face primes).
167 See Correll et al., supra note 141, at 1325 (“[T]he decision to fire on an armed target was
facilitated when that target was African American, whereas the decision not to shoot an
unarmed target was facilitated when that target was White.”).
168 See Sadler et al., supra note 164, at 301 (“Officers showed racial bias in the decision to
shoot Latinos relative to Whites and Asians.”).
163
164
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Latinos.169 The researchers summarized, “The more aggressive
their personal stereotype of Latinos, the less able officers were to
accurately distinguish objects.”170
The shooter bias results associating Latinos with hostility and
threat can be contextualized within other studies showing antiLatino implicit bias. For example, using a stereotype IAT designed
to measure ethnic stereotypes related to intelligence, James Weyant
found that participants implicitly associated the category of
Hispanic with unintelligent stereotypes and the category of White
with intelligent stereotypes.171 In an earlier study, Galen
Bodenhausen and Maryl Lichtenstein investigated stereotypes of
Hispanic aggression in the criminal justice system and found that
study participants judged defendants to be more aggressive (and
more guilty) when they were depicted as Hispanic as compared to
when they were not.172 In yet another study, this time using
methods from psychology’s field of attention and perception,
Steffanie Guillermo and Correll studied attentional biases and
compared how people visually paid attention to Latino, Black, and
White faces.173 The researchers found that Latino faces captured
study participants’ attention faster, and kept their attention longer,
than Black or White faces.174 The researchers surmised that “[s]ince
Latinos are stereotypically associated with threat, it is plausible
169 See id. at 305 (noting that “[t]he more officers endorsed stereotypes of Latinos as violent
and dangerous, the faster they tended to respond to armed than unarmed Latino targets”).
170 Id. at 306.
171 James M. Weyant, Implicit Stereotyping of Hispanics: Development and Validity of a
Hispanic Version of the Implicit Association Test, 27 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCIS. 355, 357, 360
(2005).
172 Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein, Social Stereotypes and InformationProcessing Strategies: The Impact of Task Complexity, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 871,
875 (1987) (“[S]ubjects saw the Hispanic defendant as more aggressive, more likely to be
aggressive in the future, more likely to be guilty, and more likely to commit criminal assault
in the future than a nondescript defendant . . . .”). The comparison group was described by
the authors as being “ethnically nondescript.” Id. at 872.
173 See Steffanie Guillermo & Joshua Correll, Attentional Biases Toward Latinos, 38 HISP.
J. BEHAV. SCIS. 264, 265 (2016) (“The goal of the present research was to examine preferential
attention, or attentional bias, toward Latinos.”).
174 Id. at 274 (“The current research provides the first evidence that Latino faces capture
attention faster and hold attention longer than White faces when participants are White. We
demonstrated this effect across two studies, and [found the same] even when the racial
context included Black faces . . . .”).
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that threat stereotypes are related to attention toward Latino
faces.”175
As Latinx defendants now face disproportionate treatment in the
death penalty,176 it is important not just to investigate anti-Black
bias in capital punishment but also to investigate any potential
connection between anti-Latinx bias and capital punishment
decision-making and outcomes. Our study attempts to do so at what
may be a historical moment in the wake of recent presidential
campaigns launched under the stereotype-stoking threat of Mexico
sending us “rapists” and “bringing drugs” and “crime,”177 along with
allegations that people seeking asylum in the United States were
“animals” and that “monsters” from the MS-13 gang are coming to
the United States to murder children.178
In light of the voluminous research connecting both Black and
Latino Americans to stereotypes of danger and hostility, as well as
the development of empirical methods that facilitate the testing of
implicit stereotypes in specific legal contexts, we set out to examine
whether implicit and explicit biases affect death penalty future
dangerousness determinations.

Id.
See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
177 Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug. 31,
2016, 11:35 AM), https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/ (“Donald
Trump kicked off his presidential bid more than a year ago with harsh words for Mexico.
‘They are not our friend, believe me,’ he said, before disparaging Mexican immigrants:
‘They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. . . .’”).
178 Robert E. Kessler & Nicole Fuller, Trump, Barr: Feds to Seek Death Penalty in Slaying
of Two Brentwood Teens, Other Killings, NEWSDAY (July 15, 2020, 10:48 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/ms13-murders-long-island-trump-barr-1.46901741
(“‘We believe the monsters who murder children should be put to death,’ Trump said during
a briefing with reporters inside the Oval Office Wednesday morning. ‘We seem to have quite
a good agreement on that. These people murder children and they do it as slowly and viciously
as possible. We will not allow these animals to terrorize our communities. And my
administration will not rest until every member of MS-13 is brought to justice.’”); Julie
Hirschfeld Davis & Niraj Chokshi, Trump Defends ‘Animals’ Remark, Saying It Referred to
TIMES
(May
17,
2018),
MS-13
Gang
Members,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/trump-animals-ms-13-gangs.html
(“President
Trump on Thursday defended his use of the word ‘animals’ to describe dangerous criminals
trying to cross into the United States illegally . . . . His comments this week come after he has
complained bitterly about a wave of migrants from Central America . . . arriving at the
United States border asking for asylum . . . .”).
175
176
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Considering the importance of future dangerousness
determinations in capital punishment, as well as prior research on
implicit and explicit bias, this Part describes the empirical studies
designed to measure the role—if any—of implicit and explicit racial
anti-Black and anti-Latino bias in future dangerousness
determinations in capital cases and beyond. Two national studies
were conducted on a diverse group of jury-eligible participants.
A. METHODS AND MATERIALS

1. Mock Juror Participants. Study participants came from a
diverse national sample of 547 jury-eligible participants across the
two studies described below.179 In Study 1, 271 participants from a
national sample participated. Participants were diverse in terms of
age,180 gender,181 race and ethnicity,182 and political preferences.183
In Study 2, 276 participants from a separate national sample

179 Participants in both studies were recruited via MTurk and were compensated for their
participation. Participants who were non-citizens or convicted felons were excluded from the
study results because they would likely be excluded from jury service.
180 36.16% of participants were between ages 21–30. The second most common age range
was 31–40, with 35.79% falling in this range. The third most common age range was 41–50,
with 15.13% falling in this range.
181 38.01% of the participants in Study 1 identified as female, and 61.99% identified as
male.
182 In Study 1, 74.91% of participants identified themselves as White, 13.65% identified
themselves as Black or African American, 7.38% identified themselves as Asian American,
6.27% identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino, and 2.58% identified themselves as more
than one race.
183 In Study 1, participants were asked political preferences by inquiring how strongly they
typically agreed with liberals and conservatives on a range of issues: 39.48% reported
affiliating strongly or moderately with liberal positions, 14.76% reported affiliating strongly
or very strongly with conservative positions, and the remainder reported agreeing slightly
more often with liberal positions (16.24%) or slightly more often with conservative positions
(18.08%). The remainder of participants identified as being ideologically neutral (11.44%).
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participated. These participants also displayed diversity in terms of
age,184 gender,185 race and ethnicity,186 and political preferences.187
2. The Future Dangerousness IAT and the Race Stereotype IAT.
Building on the existing body of work on implicit racial bias, we used
both a well-established IAT and one we specifically designed to
measure implicit racial biases related to future dangerousness. In
Study 1, we employed a classic Black–White stereotype IAT that
has been used in hundreds of studies.188 Participants in our study
were therefore asked to categorize photos of Black and White men
and women189 with words associated with “Positive” (the stimuli
words being Ambitious, Industrious, Successful, Calm,
Trustworthy, Ethical, and Lawful) and words associated with
“Negative” (the stimuli words being Lazy, Unmotivated,
Unemployed, Hostile, Dangerous, Threaten, and Violent). In the
first task,190 participants were instructed to press a key (e.g., the “E”
key) for Black faces and Positive words, as well as press a key (e.g.,

184 38.8% of participants in Study 2 fell within the ages of 31–40. The second most common
age range was 21–30, with 26.1% falling within this range. The third most common age range
was 41–50, with 17.0% falling in this range.
185 46.4% of the participants in Study 2 identified as female, and 53.6% identified as male.
186 In Study 2, 78.3% of participants identified themselves as White, 10.5% identified
themselves as Black or African American, 6.9% identified themselves as Asian American,
8.7% identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino, and 2.5% identified themselves as more
than one race.
187 In Study 2, 45.3% reported affiliating strongly or moderately with liberal positions,
16.7% reported affiliating strongly or very strongly with conservative positions, and the
remainder reported agreeing slightly more often with liberal positions (15.2%) or slightly
more often with conservative positions (12.3%). The remainder of participants identified as
being ideologically neutral (10.5%).
188 See, e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, supra note 99, at 15 (listing
multiple implicit racial stereotyping studies from the 1980s and 1990s); Greenwald et al.,
Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 99, at 1464–65 (describing the IAT procedure
and its use in measuring Black–White stereotypes); see also Brian A. Nosek et al.,
Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH.
36, 43–44, 52 (2007) (describing the IATs used in the study and findings on race-related
attitudes).
189 The photographs we used for the study have been used in many previous studies. See,
e.g., Nosek et al., supra note 188, at 87 app. B (describing the twelve photos used in the study).
190 This task order is presented here simply to give an example of the study. In the study
itself, the order of the two tasks was counterbalanced to minimize possible order effects.
Therefore, approximately half of the participants received tasks in the opposite order as
presented in the text: they first paired together Black with Negative and White with Positive.
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the “I” key) for White faces and Negative words. In the second task,
participants were instructed to press a key for Black faces and
Negative words, as well as for White faces and Positive words. If
participants more quickly responded to Black faces with Negative
words and White faces with Positive words, as compared to Black
faces with Positive words and White faces with Negative words, we
could thus conclude that an implicit stereotype racial bias exists.
In Study 2, we set out to design an IAT that was not simply a
measure of general implicit stereotypes but rather one that could
hone in on specific implicit anti-Black biases regarding future
dangerousness. Furthermore, due to the increasing composition of
Latino men on death row and in future dangerousness cases
generally,191 we wished to expand beyond the traditional “Black–
White paradigm” that limits racial bias discussions in a way not
reflective of a diverse America and criminal justice system. Thus,
we created two distinct versions of what we call the “Future
Dangerousness IAT.” With this structure, we set out to measure
whether people hold automatic dangerousness-related stereotypes
of Black Americans as compared to White Americans, as well as
Latino Americans as compared to White Americans. In designing
the Future Dangerousness IATs that we employed, we selected the
following stimuli to represent future danger: “Danger, Threaten,
Vicious, Hostile, Wild, Menacing, and Violent.” We selected the
following stimuli to represent future safety: “Safe, Generous,
Helpful, Friendly, Calm, Gentle, and Kind.”192 Participants in Study
2 thus completed two IATs: a Black–White Future Dangerousness
IAT and a Latinx–White Future Dangerousness IAT.193
3. Explicit Bias. Because we were interested not only in
measuring mock jurors’ implicit biases but also whether they
harbored explicit biases that they would be willing to self-report, we

191 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Influence of Latino Ethnicity on the Imposition of the Death
Penalty, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 421, 425 (2020) (“Taken together, the archival studies,
although limited in number, strongly suggest that sometimes (or perhaps, in some places) the
likelihood of a death sentence is increased when the defendant is Latino . . . .”); see also supra
notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
192 For the racial category stimuli, we selected men’s names that are highly associated with
White American, Black American, and Latinx American groups. See infra notes 202–204 and
accompanying text.
193 The order of IATs was counterbalanced in order to lessen order effects.
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also employed the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale.194 This measure has
been used and validated by prior studies and is well-known as a
measure of explicit racial (anti-Black) bias.195 The Scale, for
example, asks participants to state their level of agreement or
disagreement with statements such as the following: “How much of
the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think
blacks are responsible for creating?” and “It’s really a matter of
some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder
they could be just as well off as whites,” as well as several other
questions.196
4. Crime Vignettes. In addition to measuring participants’
implicit and explicit racial biases in Studies 1 and 2, we measured
judgments of future dangerousness for specific crimes. To do this,
participants in both studies were presented with hypothetical
crimes (in randomized order) prior to completing the IATs and were
asked to rate the future dangerousness of the defendant for each
crime. In Study 1, two of the four crimes were homicides, and the
other two were drug-related crimes (one a drug sale and the other a
robbery). The two homicides, which were largely based upon real
crimes, were as follows197:

See P.J. Henry & David O. Sears, The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale, 23 POL. PSYCH. 253,
259–62 (2002) (developing, explaining, and employing the scale for the first time).
195 See, e.g., Jamillah Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates vs.
Corporate Interests, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1473, 1496 (2017) (using questions from the Symbolic
Racism 2000 Scale to “measure contemporary racial attitudes”).
196 Henry & Sears, supra note 194, at 260. Due to space constraints, we did not employ a
measure of anti-Latinx Explicit bias.
197 The two drug-related crimes were as follows:
194

(1) The defendant is a street level drug dealer with two previous convictions
for drug possession. He always carries a gun but has never used it. He was arrested
after he tried to sell twenty dollars’ worth of marijuana to an undercover police
officer.
(2) Defendant snuck up behind the victim on a dark and mostly empty street. He
grabbed the victim from behind, pressed a sharp object against the victim’s back,
and demanded that the victim hand over an expensive looking watch. Evidence came
out at trial which suggested that the defendant was carrying a screwdriver (but no
other weapon), was high on drugs at the time of the crime, and that he suffered from
a chronic addiction. At trial, the defendant apologized to the victim.
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(1) The defendant robbed a gas station. He carried a gun
during the robbery but had told his friends
beforehand that he did not plan to fire it. In the
middle of the robbery, the store clerk was shot and
killed. The prosecution argues that the killing was
cold-blooded and intentional. The defense claims
that the gun went off accidentally as he was pointing
it at the clerk; and
(2) The defendant broke into his neighbor’s home,
expecting that the home was empty. However, the
neighbor was home, and when he threatened to call
the police, the defendant picked up a baseball bat
that was lying on the floor and struck the homeowner
in the head. The homeowner died. The defendant,
who was 14 years-old at the time, was charged in
adult court.198
No defendant names or racial identifications were provided about
the defendants in Study 1. In Study 2, participants read about, and
were asked to evaluate, six different crime vignettes, all of which
were homicides. Two examples of the crime vignettes, which were
loosely based on real cases, were as follows199:

These crime vignettes were also used in our previous study on implicit racial bias and
retribution. See Levinson et al., Race and Retribution, supra note 103, at 876.
199 The other four vignettes were as follows:
198

(1) The defendant was found with a high-powered rifle and stolen belongings in his
vehicle. The rifle type matched the bullets used in the killing of a married couple,
and some of the belongings were identified as having come from the defendant’s car.
The medical examiner had testified that the victims had been shot from a distance,
and likely never saw the shooter before they were killed. The defendant presented
evidence of organic brain damage, mood disorders which resulted in poor judgment,
and that his childhood was marked by bizarre discipline.
In the results section statistics, this vignette is labelled “Scenario 2.” See infra notes 215–
216.
(2) The defendant, who was involved in a conspiracy to smuggle undocumented
immigrants into the country, was part of a group “guarding” the
immigrants (against their will) while waiting for the immigrants’ family members
to pay “smuggling fees.” When two of the immigrants attempted to escape, the
defendant or one of his group struck them multiple times. Both immigrants died
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(1) The defendant had been responsible for multiple
burglaries from the victim’s house. One day, the
defendant, along with two other men, entered the
victim’s house while the victim was home. The
defendant looked for money while the victim was
held at gunpoint. The victim was taken away from
his home in a van, where he scuffled with one of the
men and was shot during the altercation. The victim
died later that day from his wounds. The defendant
claims that the situation got out of hand and that one
of the other men was responsible for the killing;200
and
(2) A former employee of a Chili’s restaurant decided to
rob the restaurant location. During the robbery, two
restaurant employees were killed. The defendant
claims that the killings were unplanned and that all
he wanted to do was get the cash and escape, but the
employees tried to be heroic and stop the robbery.201

from blunt force wounds. The defendant claims that he did not use deadly force but
that one of his group did.
In the results section statistics, this vignette is labeled “Scenario 3.” See infra note 215.
(3) A US postal worker was found dead after being accused by the defendant of
delivering the defendant’s mail to his estranged wife. The defendant was found with
materials that were used in disposing of the body. Evidence was presented that the
defendant had a severe mental illness that rendered him paranoid, and that the
mental illness was exacerbated by drug use and alcohol.
In the results section statistics, this vignette is labeled “Scenario 5.”
(4) The defendant robbed a gas station. The defendant carried a gun during the
robbery, but had told the defendant’s friends beforehand that he did not plan to fire
it. In the middle of the robbery, the store clerk was shot and killed. The prosecution
argues that the killing was cold-blooded and intentional. The defense claims that
the gun went off accidentally as the defendant was pointing it at the clerk.
In the results section statistics, this vignette is labeled “Scenario 6”.
200 In the Results section, infra note 215 and accompanying text, this scenario is called
“Scenario 1”.
201 In the Results section, infra note 215 and accompanying text, this scenario is called
“Scenario 4”.
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The defendants’ race and ethnicity were not disclosed in Study 2,
but the defendants were given names that resembled popular
names of Black Americans,202 White Americans,203 and Latino
Americans.204 Each participant read six short cases in a randomly
determined order: two cases with a defendant who possessed a
White American sounding name, two cases with a defendant who
possessed a Black American sounding name, and two cases with a
defendant who possessed a Latino American sounding name. The
vignette–name pair was randomly determined between
participants. After reading each crime vignette, participants were
asked to evaluate how dangerous the defendant was likely to be205
and were also asked whether they preferred that the defendant
receive a life sentence or a death penalty sentence.206
B. HYPOTHESES

Prior to conducting the studies, we hypothesized as follows:
1) Jury-eligible citizens will harbor well-known
implicit racial biases whereby they automatically
associate Black with negative stereotypes and White
with positive stereotypes.
2) Using a Black–White Future Dangerousness IAT
that we designed for this study, jury-eligible citizens
will harbor implicit biases whereby they
automatically associate Black men with future
danger and White men with future safety.
The Black American sounding names were Jamal Brown and Reginald Washington.
The White American sounding names were Nathaniel Kinnear and Chris Jensen.
204 The Latino American sounding names were Hector Sanchez and Roberto Garcia.
205 There were three future dangerousness measures asked, as follows:
202
203

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1) The
defendant is likely to pose a significant risk of danger in the future, (2) If given an
opportunity for release after 20 years, the defendant will be likely to pose a
significant risk to others in the free world, and (3) If sentenced to life in prison
without parole, the defendant is likely to pose a significant risk of future danger by
committing acts of violence against others in prison.
206 The item was as follows: “The defendant will now be sentenced to life in prison or the
death penalty. Which sentence do you prefer[?]” The possible responses ranged from “strongly
prefer life in prison (1)” to “strongly prefer death penalty (4).”
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3) Using a Latinx–White Future Dangerousness IAT,
jury-eligible citizens will harbor implicit biases
whereby they automatically associate Latinx men
with future danger and White men with future
safety.
4) Jurors’ implicit bias levels (on the IATs) and explicit
bias levels (on the Symbolic Racism Scale) will
predict their assessments of defendants’ future
dangerousness and sentencing recommendations,
such that higher levels of racial bias will lead to
harsher dangerousness judgments and sentences.
5) Jurors will rank future dangerousness levels higher,
and recommend more support for the death penalty,
when defendants have Black-sounding or Latinosounding names than when they have Whitesounding names.
6) “Death Qualified” jurors will possess higher levels of
implicit and explicit racial biases than “nullifier” or
“excludable” jurors.
C. STATISTICS

To test our hypotheses, we conducted several statistical analyses.
With regard to Hypotheses 1–3 (implicit bias measurement), we
calculated ‘d’ scores by following the suggested statistical processes
established by implicit social cognition researchers and used t-tests
to evaluate those ‘d’ scores for statistical significance.207 For
Hypothesis 4, we evaluated predictive models of decision-making by
regressing juror judgments of future dangerousness and life or
death recommendations upon implicit bias scores of IATs and
Symbolic Racism Scale judgments, plus baseline beliefs regarding
danger in Study 2. To test Hypothesis 5, we conducted a series of
ANOVAs208 (analysis of variance) to compare dangerousness and
207 We followed the IAT scoring algorithms recommended in Anthony Greenwald, Brian A.
Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An
Improved Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 197, 201 (2003).
208 ANOVA is a series of techniques that segment the observed variance in a dataset into
the various sources of that variance, which allows for the comparison of the means between
multiple groups. For example, is the variance in a sample (such as measured happiness)
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death penalty scores based upon the race/ethnicity-sounding name
of the defendant (White, Latino, or Black). For Hypothesis 6, we
conducted a series of t-tests209 to compare death qualified and
excludable jurors. All statistics are presented in footnotes
corresponding to the findings described in the text below.
D. RESULTS

The results of the studies confirm several, but not all, of the
hypotheses. Generally, the results of the studies indicate first that
future dangerousness and implicit racial bias against Black and
Latino men are inexorably intertwined, and second, that implicit
and explicit racial bias levels predict case-based future
dangerousness predictions. We present the study results below,
organized by the hypotheses set forth above.
1. Strong Negative Stereotypes About Black Americans. The
results of Study 1’s analysis of implicit racial stereotypes (on the
stereotype Black–White IAT) confirmed that jury-eligible
participants associated White with positive and Black with
negative. Participants were significantly more likely to quickly
group together Black faces with negative stereotypes, such as lazy,
violent, and unmotivated, and White faces with positive
stereotypes, such as ambitious and ethical.210 These results are
consistent with two decades of research on implicit racial biases and

attributable to differences between two groups (such as northerners and southerners), or is
it due to other, unmeasured or unexplained variation within the group (such as how much
candy they had this morning)? See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 37–38 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining ANOVA techniques).
209 One-sample t-tests test whether single populations differ from hypothesized values. See
RONALD CHRISTENSEN, ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, DESIGN, AND REGRESSION: APPLIED
STATISTICAL METHODS 37–42 (1996) (describing one-sample t-tests). The IAT’s hypothesized
value is zero, meaning no bias. When an IAT score is significantly different from zero, that
IAT score indicates bias in a population. Thus, this one-sample t-test tested whether the
population’s IAT score differed significantly from zero. See also Levinson et al., Judging
Implicit Bias, supra note 107, at 103 n.214.
210 IAT d M = 0.34, SD = 0.39, T-test comparing with 0 revealed that the score was
significantly higher than 0 (t(270) = 14.00, p<.001).
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demonstrate that the participants implicitly associate White with
positive stereotypes and Black with negative stereotypes.211
Graph 1: Future Dangerousness Reaction Times
(in Milliseconds)

Reaction times on IAT blocks. Error bars represent standard error.
2. Black Men: Implicit Future Dangers. The results of the first
future dangerousness IAT (Black–White) confirmed our hypothesis:
jury-eligible participants significantly (and quite strongly)
associated Black with danger and White with safety.212 These
findings are particularly interesting because no empirical studies
have examined whether jurors hold automatic associations between
race and estimations of future dangerousness.
3. Latino Men: Implicit Future Dangers. The results of the second
future dangerousness IAT (Latino–White) also confirmed our
hypothesis: we found that jury-eligible participants (also quite
See, e.g., Nosek et al., supra note 188, at 53 (describing significant White–Black IAT
results).
212 IAT d M = 0.46, SD = 0.41, T-test comparing with 0 revealed that the score was
significantly higher than 0 (t(275) = 18.54, p<.001).
211
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strongly) associated Latino with danger and White with
safety.213 This finding is notable because only a handful of empirical
studies have looked at Latino stereotypes in the criminal justice
system or death penalty context.214 Here, we found that, in the
context of future dangerousness, jury-eligible citizens hold similar
dangerousness stereotypes for Latino men as they do for Black men.
Graph 2: Scatterplot of Future Dangerousness and Explicit
Bias (SRS) Score

213 IAT d M = 0.44, SD = 0.40, T-test comparing with 0 revealed that the score was
significantly higher than 0 (t(275) = 18.17, p<.001).
214 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 191, at 424–25 (describing five county-wide studies that
sought to determine whether the ethnicity of the victim or the defendant was a “significant
factor[] in deciding whether to seek the death penalty against a defendant”).
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Graph 3: Scatterplot of Life/Death Decision and Explicit
Bias (SRS) Score

4. Implicit and Explicit Biases Predict Future Dangerousness
and Life/Death. Both implicit and explicit bias levels predicted
judgments of future dangerousness and sentence recommendations.
In Study 1, anti-Black implicit bias predicted assessments of future
dangerousness in the two homicide cases,215 and explicit bias scores
predicted participants’ assessments of future dangerousness in the
two non-homicide cases.216 In Study 2, explicit racial biases
215 In order to investigate the relation between future dangerousness and predictors, we
ran the following regression(stepwise): Future Dangerousness (FD) = beta1 x IAT d + beta2
x SRS + c as full model. On scenario 1 data (the first homicide case, gas station), only IAT d
predicted FD (adjusted R2 = .01, F(1, 269) = 3.58, p = .06, beta1 = 0.12, t = 1.90, p = .06, beta2,
ns.). On scenario 2 data (the second homicide case, neighbor’s home), both IAT d and SRS
predicted FD (adjusted R2 = .02, F(1, 269) = 3.97, p = .02, beta1 = .12, t = 1.96, p = .05, beta2
= .10, t = 1.67, p = .10). On scenario 3 data (drug dealer case), only SRS predicted FD (adjusted
R2 = .06, F(1, 269) = 17.82, p<.001, beta2 = .25, t = 4.22, p<.001, beta1, ns.). On scenario 4
data (robbery case), both IAT d and SRS predicted FD (adjusted R2 = .02, F(1, 269) = 7.48, p
= .01, beta2 = .17, t = 2.74, p = .01, beta1, ns.).
216 In order to investigate the relation between life/death decision and predictors, we ran
the following regression (stepwise): life/death decision = beta1 x Black–Danger IAT d + beta2
x LatinX IAT d + beta3 x SRS + c as full model. On all six models, only the SRS score was a
significant predictor of life/death decision (adjusted R2 of all models > .03(max = .11), Fs >
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predicted future dangerousness determinations and death penalty
decision-making.217 Regression analyses for Study 2 showed that
regardless of the defendant’s name, mock jurors’ explicit racial bias
predicted life-death decisions (in each of the six cases and overall on
averaged measures). And these explicit racial biases predict
defendants’ future dangerousness decisions. Essentially, the
greater anti-Black racial bias jurors had, the more dangerous they
assessed all defendants to be.
5. Limited to No Effects Based on Defendant Name. Of the six
short fact patterns we presented, only the “Chili’s case” showed
marginally significant differences based on whether the defendant
had a White-sounding name, Black-sounding name, or Latinosounding name. The “Chili’s case” was the case in which the
defendant killed victims while robbing a Chili’s restaurant. Jury
eligible citizens were more likely to rate a defendant as posing a
future danger if they read about a Latino-sounding named
defendant or a Black-sounding named defendant, compared to if the
jury-eligible citizens read about a defendant with a White-sounding
name, with marginal statistical significance.218 The other vignettes,
10.58, ps<.001, beta3s > .19(max = .34), ts> 3.25, ps< .001). As for future dangerousness
evaluation, we ran the following regression (stepwise): FD = beta1 x Black–Danger IAT d +
beta2 x LatinX IAT d + beta3 x SRS + c as full model. Except for one (the model on scenario
2, the immigrant smuggling homicide scenario), on five models only the SRS score was a
significant predictor of FD (adjusted R2 of all models > .03(max = .09), Fs > 8.6, ps < .004,
beta3s > .18(max = .30), ts > 2.94, ps < .004). Even in the weakest model (scenario 2, the
immigrant smuggling homicide scenario), a marginally significant SRS effect was revealed,
but no IAT d effects were (adjusted R2 = .01, F(1, 174) = 3.41, p = .07, beta3 = .11, t = 1.85, p
= .07).
217 To investigate the effects of predictors on future dangerousness, we ran the following
regression (stepwise): averaged 6 FD scores = beta1 x Black-Danger IAT d + beta2 x LatinX
IAT d + beta3 x SRS + c as full model. The result showed that only SRS was a significant
predictor of future dangerousness but neither IAT score is (adjusted R2 = .08, F(1, 274) =
25.26, p<.001, beta3 = .29, t = 5.03, p<.001). Also, for investigating life/death decision model,
we ran the following regression (stepwise): averaged 6 life/death decision = beta1 x Black–
Danger IAT d + beta2 x LatinX IAT d + beta3 x SRS + c as full model. On this model, the
results showed that also only SRS was a significant predictor of life/death decision (adjusted
R2 = .14, F(1, 274) = 44.56, p<.001, beta3 = .37, t = 6.68, p<.001).
218 In the “Chili’s case,” there were marginally significant race effects on future
dangerousness questionnaire item 1 and 2 (Fs(2, 273)>2.36, p<.10). On item 1, the follow-up
analysis comparing three races (multiple comparison with Bonferroni correction) showed that
there was a marginally significant difference between the White-sounding names and the
Latino-sounding names (t = 2.15, p<.10, MBlack = 74.68, SDBlack = 20.71, MLatino = 76.97, SDLatino
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however, did not show significant differences based upon the name
of the defendant.
6. Death Qualified Jurors and Explicit Racial Bias. Death
qualified jurors displayed higher levels of explicit racial bias (on the
Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale) than those who would not be eligible
for death penalty jury service due to the fact that they could not vote
guilty knowing that the death penalty was an option (known as
“nullifiers”), or due to the fact that they would not consider a death
sentence
in
any
circumstance
(known
as
“excludables”).219 Interestingly, although our research has
previously shown that death qualified jurors possess lower implicit
bias levels on three different race IATs—the Value of Life IAT,220
the Stereotype IAT,221 and the Retribution IAT222—these jurors did
not display significantly different bias levels on the two Future
Dangerousness IATs we tested here.223 In addition to the higher
levels of explicit racial bias they reported, death qualified jurors
were generally more likely to believe that murderers overall are
more likely to be a future danger.224 This finding is consistent with
the Witherspoon and post-Witherspoon line of studies, which
demonstrates the guilt-proneness of death qualified jurors.225 These
= 18.93, MWhite = 70.82, SDWhite = 20.24). Also, on item 2, the follow-up test showed that there
was a marginally significant difference between the White-sounding names and the Blacksounding names (t = 2.29, p<.10, MBlack = 68.57, SDBlack = 23.77, MLatino = 65.58, SDWhite = 22.65,
MWhite = 60.52, SDWhite = 23.43).
219 MDeath_qualified = 2.30, SDDeath_qualified = 0.48, MNullifiers&Excludables = 2.02, SDNullifiers&Excludables =
0.47, t(274) = 4.27, p < .001.
220 See Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 103, at 559 (presenting results from
the Value of Life IAT in a 2014 study).
221 See id. (presenting results from the Stereotype IAT in the same study).
222 See Levinson et al., Race and Retribution, supra note 103, at 879–83 (presenting results
from the Retribution IAT in a 2019 study).
223 Black–Danger IAT d: MDeath_qualified = 0.46, SDDeath_qualified = 0.40, MNullifiers&Excludables = 0.46,
SDNullifiers&Excludables = 0.43, t(264) = 0.03, ns.
LatinX–Danger IAT d: MDeath_qualified = 0.43, SDDeath_qualified = 0.40, MNullifiers&Excludables = 0.44,
SDNullifiers&Excludables = 0.38, t(264) = 0.04, ns.
224 This result is based on a general measure of how dangerous murderers are likely to be
in the future, rather than on the individual cases. In this analysis, we used the following
regression model (stepwise): general question about murderer’s future dangerousness = beta1
x Black–Danger IAT d + beta2 x LatinX IAT d + beta3 x SRS + c as full model. The result
revealed that only SRS was a significant predictor of FD(Adjusted R2 = .03, F(1, 194) = 6.08,
p = .01, beta3 = .18, t = 2.61, p = .01).
225 See infra notes 242–244 and accompanying text.
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results were also true in juror judgments of the six vignettes. In all
six of those cases, nullifiers and excludables scored defendants as
possessing lower individual dangerousness judgments and were less
likely to vote for death.226

V. THE FUTURE OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
The results of the studies detailed in Part IV demonstrate that
harmful racial and ethnic stereotypes are automatically and
inextricably associated with the future dangerousness
determination. In this Part, we consider the implications of the
empirical study and discuss a path forward. We thus consider topics
including the constitutionality of the future dangerousness inquiry,
the future of death qualification, and the expansion of legal
discourse on capital punishment to include a discussion of Latino
men. This Part also acknowledges that the study results are not
226 Future dangerousness scores:
Senario1: MDeath_qualified = 65.43, SDDeath_qualified = 19.49, MNullifiers&Excludables =
SDNullifiers&Excludables = 20.07, t(274) = 2.74, p < .01.
Senario2: MDeath_qualified = 79.68, SDDeath_qualified = 15.84, MNullifiers&Excludables =
SDNullifiers&Excludables = 14.86, t(274) = 3.54, p < .001.
Senario3: MDeath_qualified = 68.80, SDDeath_qualified = 19.25, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 17.29, t(274) = 2.37, p = .02.
Senario4: MDeath_qualified = 66.47, SDDeath_qualified = 19.19, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 19.78, t(274) = 2.82, p < .01.
Senario5: MDeath_qualified = 76.05, SDDeath_qualified = 16.84, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 19.51, t(274) = 3.54, p < .001.
Senario6: MDeath_qualified = 62.81, SDDeath_qualified = 20.25, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 20.81, t(274) = 4.25, p < .001.
Life/death decision:
Senario1: MDeath_qualified = 1.84, SDDeath_qualified = 0.83, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.57, t(274) = 5.53, p < .001.
Senario2: MDeath_qualified = 2.30, SDDeath_qualified = 0.99, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.81, t(274) = 6.64, p < .001.
Senario3: MDeath_qualified = 1.99, SDDeath_qualified = 0.87, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.69, t(274) = 5.32, p < .001.
Senario4: MDeath_qualified = 2.15, SDDeath_qualified = 0.95, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.67, t(274) = 6.47, p < .001.
Senario5: MDeath_qualified = 1.98, SDDeath_qualified = 0.92, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.62, t(274) = 5.15, p < .001.
Senario6: MDeath_qualified = 1.92, SDDeath_qualified = 0.87, MNullifiers&Excludables=
SDNullifiers&Excludables= 0.66, t(274) = 5.18, p < .001.
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limited to the capital punishment context; it outlines how the study
results may impact other areas of criminal justice where future
dangerousness plays a legally sanctioned role.
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
INQUIRY

Given the massive importance of the future dangerousness
determination to capital punishment,227 the documentation of the
racialized connection between racial bias and future dangerousness
should serve to invalidate the constitutionality of death penalty
determinations based upon future dangerousness.
Some scholars have justified the consideration of future
dangerousness as distinct from that of retribution and deterrence
with a separate inquiry relevant to incapacitation instead.228 Others
have noted that incapacitation is not one of the permissible
purposes justifying capital punishment—the Court’s “own
judgment”229 is shaped by considering two, and only two, recognized
purposes of capital punishment: retribution and deterrence.230 As
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker have described, “[t]he crucial
exclusion of incapacitation from this list permits a plausible finding
that the death penalty is inappropriate even for categories of
offenders that include those who appear to pose a substantial risk
of future danger.”231
Courts, legislatures, and the academy have spent years
attempting to “define and implement [the] principle” that the
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 68, at 1124–25 (“The Court has barred the death penalty
when it has found the penalty to exceed the goals of retribution and deterrence, without
considering the aim of incapacitation. . . . The risk of future violence[, however,] is often a
dispositive reason for a death sentence.”).
229 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
230 See G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM L. 65, 91 (2012) (“[T]he Court noted only two constitutionally acceptable bases for
imposition of the death penalty—‘deterrence, and retribution.’” (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S.
at 441)).
231 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The Effect
of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 184 (2008).
227
228

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

63

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 5

288

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:225

“[e]volving standards of decency . . . presume[] respect for the
individual and thus moderation or restraint in the application of
capital punishment.”232 This effort has generally taken two different
approaches—the first adopting “general rules that ensure
consistency”233 and the second insisting on rules that permit
“individualized consideration.”234 It has led to broad-scale
questioning of the constitutionality of capital punishment by a
number of Justices.235
State supreme courts have taken different but responsive steps
to address the evidence of racial bias. In Washington, the state
supreme court held, “The death penalty is invalid because it is
imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner.”236 In

Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435–36.
See id. at 436 (“The tension between general rules and case-specific circumstances has
produced results not altogether satisfactory.”).
234 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“The Ohio death
penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors
we now hold to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases.”).
235 Many Justices have raised questions concerning the death penalty. See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan J., dissenting) (“[T]he punishment of death, for
whatever crime and under all circumstances, is ‘cruel and unusual’ in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.”); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
death penalty . . . is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[D]espite the effort of the States and courts to devise
legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty
remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.”); JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994) (“Powell was asked whether he would
change his vote in any case . . . . I have come to think that capital punishment should be
abolished[, he replied].”); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 85 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A]
significant concern is the risk of discriminatory application of the death penalty.”); Tuilaepa
v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 991–92 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“One of the greatest
evils of leaving jurors with largely unguided discretion is the risk that this discretion will be
exercised on the basis of constitutionally impermissible considerations—primary among
them, race. . . . For far too many jurors, the most important ‘circumstances of the crime’ are
the race of the victim or the defendant.”); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 909 (2015) (Breyer
J., dissenting) (“The circumstances and the evidence of the death penalty’s application have
changed radically . . . . Given those changes, I believe that it is now time to reopen the
question.”). Notably, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in this opinion. Id. at 908.
236 State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627, 635 (Wash. 2018) (“Given the evidence before this
court and our judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias against black defendants in this
state, we are confident that the association between race and the death penalty is not
attributed to random chance.”).
232
233
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Connecticut, the state supreme court held the death penalty
unconstitutional, in part because “[t]o the extent that the ultimate
punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis of impermissible
considerations such as his, or his victim’s, race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status, rather than the severity of his crime, his execution
does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the moral order.”237
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the U.S. Supreme Court assumed that
statistics could show that race plays a role in capital sentencing but
declined to invalidate the death penalty scheme because the
statistical proof did not meet the Court’s expectations as to how a
capital defendant might demonstrate actual bias.238 Our research
explains the statistical evidence that race plays a role in capital
sentencing (i.e., that Black and Latino defendants are more likely
to get the death penalty) by proving that race is inexorably
connected to future dangerousness assessments on both an
automatic (implicit) and controlled (explicit) cognitive level.
The McCleskey Court, in considering statistical racialized
impacts,239 never anticipated that social science and statistics would
be able to isolate a particular factor within a death penalty scheme
and show that a distinct legal inquiry, for example, is itself a
delivery mechanism of bias. This is what our study results have
done; they have shown that one particular death penalty scheme,
that of future dangerousness, is corrupted by implicit and explicit
bias.
Our research results thus detail how the mere existence of the
future dangerousness determination acts as a racially biased trigger
for jurors considering capital punishment. Just as Phillip Goff
identified how the use of animal imagery in capital cases activates

237 State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 66, 84–85 (Conn. 2015) (“In short, the legislature could
not have come any closer to fully abolishing capital punishment without actually doing so.
We perceive no ringing legislative endorsement of the death penalty in Connecticut. . . . [W]e
hold that capital punishment, as currently applied, violates the constitution of Connecticut.”).
238 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987) (“Even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that
race was a factor in McCleskey’s particular case. Statistics at most may show only a likelihood
that a particular factor entered into some decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
239 See id. at 309 (acknowledging Baldus’s study but declining to accept it “as the
constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital
sentencing decisions”).
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racial bias,240 the invocation of consideration of future
dangerousness aligns with racial hierarchies in death qualified
jurors. To paraphrase Justice Roberts’s language in Buck v. Davis,
the concept of future dangerousness is indeed itself a racially deadly
toxin.241
B. BIASED JURIES: THE PROCESS OF DEATH QUALIFICATION

For decades, and especially in the era between Witherspoon242
and Lockhart,243 social scientists assembled an impressive library of
studies that linked the process of death qualifying jurors to
“stacking the deck” for a death sentence.244 Although the Lockhart
240 See Goff et al., supra note 155, at 304 (“[E]ven controlling for implicit anti-Black
prejudice, the implicit association between Blacks and apes can lead to greater endorsement
of violence against a Black suspect than against a White suspect. . . . [Moreover,] subtle media
representations of Blacks as apelike are associated with jury decisions to execute Black
defendants.”).
241 See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (“But when a jury hears expert testimony
that expressly makes a defendant’s race directly pertinent on the question of life or death,
the impact of that evidence cannot be measured simply by how much air time it received at
trial or how many pages it occupies in the record. Some toxins can be deadly in small doses.”).
242 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521–22 (1968) (“Specifically, we hold that a
sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen
by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death
penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.”).
243 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182 (1986) (“Unlike the Illinois system criticized
by the Court in Witherspoon, . . . the Arkansas system excludes from the jury only those who
may properly be excluded from the penalty phase of the deliberations under
Witherspoon . . . .”).
244 See, e.g., Edward J. Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases
Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW WILSON
J.L. 11, 13 (1980) (“[T]he exclusion of scrupled jurors under Witherspoon v. Illinois would tend
to make the jury more conviction prone and less representative.”); Edward J. Bronson, On the
Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical
Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (1970) (evaluating “whether [Colorado]
jurors favoring the death penalty are more conviction prone than those who oppose it”);
Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death
Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 53, 54–55 (1984) (noting that death-qualified juries are “unusually punitive”
and lack proportional representation); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process
vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46–48
(1984) (discussing how death qualification excludes one-sixth of fair, impartial jurors and
discriminates against women and Black jurors, who “[c]ompared to the death-qualified
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Court was not swayed by the studies that had been submitted into
testimony at that time,245 the wisdom underlying the challenge to
death qualification has remained, and even intensified. Thirty years
post-Lockhart, in a concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, Justice
Stevens expressed his continuing concern about death qualification,
harkening back to the petitioner in Lockhart’s central claim:
Of special concern to me are rules that deprive the
defendant of a trial by jurors representing a fair cross
section of the community. Litigation involving both
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges has
persuaded me that the process of obtaining a “death
qualified jury” is really a procedure that has the
purpose and effect of obtaining a jury that is biased in
favor of conviction. The prosecutorial concern that
death verdicts would rarely be returned by 12 randomly
selected jurors should be viewed as objective evidence
supporting the conclusion that the penalty is
excessive.246
Justice Stevens’s concerns, and the studies underlying them, have
yet to sway the Court to declare death qualification

jurors . . . are more concerned with the maintenance of the fundamental due process
guarantees of the Constitution, less punitive, and less mistrustful of the defense”); Craig
Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification
Process, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122 (1984) (analyzing whether the process of witnessing
prospective jurors dismissed based on opposition to the death penalty creates biases in jurors’
minds); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567, 568 (1971) (conducting cognitive tests to assess
the relationship between attitudes toward capital punishment and guilt determination);
William C. Thompson, Claudia L. Cowan, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Joan C. Harrington, Death
Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109 (1984) (“[D]eath-qualified jurors have a lower threshold of conviction
than excludables.”).
245 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173 (“Having identified some of the more serious problems
with McCree’s studies, however, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies
are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that ‘death qualification’ in fact
produces juries somewhat more ‘conviction-prone’ than ‘non-death-qualified’ juries. We hold,
nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from ‘death qualifying’ juries
in capital cases.”).
246 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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unconstitutional. But, at the time of Baze, and certainly at the time
of Lockhart, researchers had yet to empirically investigate the
specific racial biasing effects of the death qualification process. Two
studies published in 2007, only one year before Baze was decided,
demonstrated that death qualified jurors are not only different from
“excludable” jurors because they are more conviction prone; they
differ in many ways.247 And our research has shown, on three
separate IATs as well as explicit bias measures, that death qualified
jurors harbor higher levels of both implicit and explicit bias than
jurors who would not be allowed to serve.248 The results presented
in Part IV add to this corpus of data. Although the Future
Dangerousness IAT did not display such differences in death
qualification in this study, the Symbolic Racism Scale did.249 Thus,
we are confronted with yet another study that shows that death
penalty jurors are handpicked in a way that results in more racially
biased juries. In the context of one of the most highly racialized
areas of law in history, such a procedural result can hardly be
considered legitimate. Thus, in light of the results of our study, and
studies before it, courts should no longer permit—or even be

247 See Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, The Impact of Death Qualification, Belief in a Just
World, Legal Authoritarianism, and Locus of Control on Venirepersons’ Evaluations of
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 25 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 57, 61
(2007) (listing the ways that death-qualified jurors think differently from “excludable” jurors,
including that death-qualified jurors are “more likely to exhibit a high belief in a just world,
espouse legal authoritarian beliefs, have an internal locus of control, and lend greater weight
to aggravating factors”); Brooke Butler, Death Qualification and Prejudice: The Effect of
Implicit Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia on Capital Defendants’ Right to Due Process, 25
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 857, 865 (2007) (“[M]ore support for the death penalty was correlated with
more negative attitudes toward women and higher levels of homophobia, racism, and
sexism.”).
248 Levinson et al., Race and Retribution, supra note 103, at 880–81, 886 (“[P]articipants’
implicit racial biases actually led to their death qualification status—the higher the bias, the
more likely they were to be retributive generally, and the more likely they were to be death
qualified.”); Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 103, at 557–60, 567–71 (cataloguing
data showing the various biases commonly displayed by death-qualified jurors); see also
Butler & Moran, supra note 247, at 66 (finding that “[d]eath-qualified venirepersons . . . were
significantly more likely to recommend the death sentence than were their excludable and
civil libertarian counterparts”); Butler, supra note 247, at 865 (“As hypothesized, deathqualified venirepersons were more likely to have more positive attitudes toward the death
penalty and higher levels of homophobia, modern racism and modern sexism.”).
249 See supra Section IV.D.6.
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C. IMPLICIT BIAS AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS OF LATINO MEN

Previous research on race and the death penalty, as well as
scholarship examining the role of racial bias in the criminal justice
system more generally, has focused primarily on the impact of racial
bias on Black defendants.250 Our study amplifies the concerns raised
by prior research on the effects of implicit and explicit bias on Black
defendants in capital cases; it also expands research on implicit bias
in the criminal justice system by investigating potential bias
against Latino men in the administration of the death penalty. As
described in Part II, Latino men have been disproportionately
charged with federal capital crimes based on future
dangerousness.251 Indeed, future dangerousness has been alleged
against Latino defendants at a disproportionate rate—higher than
that against Black, White, or other minority defendants.252 More
specifically, there has been an allegation of future dangerousness
against 81% of Latino defendants authorized for the federal death
penalty, compared to 67% in all other cases.253 Furthermore, an
allegation of future dangerousness has been made against 95% of
the Latino defendants tried for federal capital murder since late
2007.254
The empirical study we conducted expands the reach of implicit
bias in criminal law discourse to reflect this reality in which Latino
men may be disproportionately alleged—and believed—to be future
dangers. Our study’s IAT results indicate specifically that death
qualified jurors automatically associated Latino men with future
dangerousness and White men with future safety.255 These results
not only support the claims raised about the constitutional
See supra notes 88, 96 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical studies focusing on
anti-Black discrimination in the death penalty and beyond).
251 See supra notes 85–86 (presenting data about future dangerousness, gathered by one of
this Article’s authors, G. Ben. Cohen).
252 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
255 See supra Section IV.D.3.
250
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permissibility of future dangerousness in the death penalty but also
necessitate additional research regarding Latino defendants within
the death penalty realm, and elsewhere in the criminal justice
system.
D. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS BEYOND THE DEATH PENALTY

This Article, and the empirical studies we conducted, were
framed around the continuing convergence of racial bias and the
death penalty. Considering that the overwhelming majority of
executions have occurred in states where future dangerousness
testimony is permitted, as well as the continuing racial disparities
in the administration of the death penalty,256 this framing was
intentional. However, it is notable that many of our empirical study
methods and results likely have import beyond the realm of capital
punishment. Although determinations of future dangerousness by
juries are a unique attribute of the modern death penalty, the
subjectivity of predicting a defendant’s future dangerousness is
relevant to other areas of criminal justice as well. For example,
prosecutors’ estimates and judges’ determinations of a defendant’s
future dangerousness are at the heart of daily decisions regarding
whether to detain defendants pre-trial.257 While commentators have
256 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 230, at 92–98 (illustrating a link between the historical
development of the death penalty, its retributive rationale, lynchings, and “racialized
vigilante ‘justice’”); Catherine M. Grosso et al., Death by Stereotype: Race, Ethnicity, and
California’s Failure to Implement Furman’s Narrowing Requirement, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1394,
1426–39 (2019) (presenting study results regarding how the application of California’s death
penalty statute affects defendants of various ethnic and racial backgrounds
disproportionately); Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 585, 587 (2020) (“[T]he overall execution rate is a staggering
seventeen times greater for defendants convicted of killing a white victim.”); see also David
C. Baldus, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Racial Discrimination
in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States Armed Forces
(1984–2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1300 (2012) (“[T]he 1984 executive order
designed to bring military law into conformity with Furman failed to purge the risk of racial
prejudice from the administration of the death penalty in the United States Armed Forces
from 1984 through 2005.”).
257 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (requiring in multiple sections that a judicial officer, before
releasing a defendant, consider whether or not the defendant will pose a danger to someone
or the community); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that future
dangerousness considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 are constitutional because those
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indeed raised the prospect of racial biases operating in such bail
decisions,258 and statistics have long supported those concerns,259
our empirical study results offer a unique look at the way Black and
Latino men may automatically be perceived as dangerous,
sometimes even without the perceiver’s awareness.
Beyond bail, the effects of race and ethnicity on future
dangerousness judgments must be investigated in non-capital
sentencing decisions, as well as in parole determinations. In the
context of sentencing, it is judges whose susceptibility to implicit
and explicit biases is most at issue. Prior research has established
that judges are likely no different from the rest of the population
when it comes to implicit bias.260 The same is likely true for parole
boards. Considering that parole’s reach can be massive, there is
some urgency to expand the research paradigm.

determinations are out of “concern for the safety and . . . lives of . . . citizens”); see also
Muhammad B. Sardar, Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives?: Ending Cash Bail and
Its Impact on Pretrial Incarceration, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1430–31 (2019) (detailing the
history of 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and the rest of the Bail Reform Act and explaining Congress’s
reason for amending the Act “to include dangerousness to the community as a factor in
assessing bail”).
258 See Sardar, supra note 257, at 1431 (“Th[e] increased discretion [regarding future
dangerousness] can be problematic when one considers a judiciary that is often out of step
with the jurisdiction they preside over and the inherent racial biases, be it implicit or explicit,
against minority defendants.”); Dana Paikowsky, Jails As Polling Places: Living up to the
Obligation to Enfranchise the Voters We Jail, 54 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 829,
866–67 (2019) (“Dangerousness, however, is not and has never been a neutral criterion.”);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED.
SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015) (“Throughout most of the twentieth century, race was used
explicitly and directly as a predictor of dangerousness. From their inception in the 1920s to
at least the 1970s, many of the prediction tools expressly used the nationality and race of the
parents of the inmate as one of the central factors to predict future dangerousness.”).
259 See, e.g., Sardar, supra note 257, at 1431 n.77 (“Empirical evidence has demonstrated
that race and ethnic bias can contribute to disproportionate treatment of minorities in the
setting of bail, use of peremptory challenges, plea bargaining, and obtaining adequate defense
representation.” (citing Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 47–48
(1994))).
260 See Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009)
(concluding that judges hold similar implicit biases about race as the rest of the population);
Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias, supra note 107, at 110–12 (finding that federal and
state judges displayed negative implicit biases against Asian American and Jewish people on
an IAT).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a post-McCleskey world, striking racial disparities have
become the defining feature of capital punishment in America.261
The courts have offered little respite, perhaps internalizing Justice
Scalia’s shoulder shrugging at racialized statistics as emotional
precedent.262 The expanding realm of the future dangerousness
inquiry has done racial justice no favors either; what was seen as
likely an unconstitutional effort by Texas to reestablish capital
punishment in the 1970s has perhaps turned into America’s biggest
engine of unequal death.263 Despite this bleak moment, modern
empirical methods have offered new manners to investigate the
ways that specific legal processes may be fueling the racialized
machinery of the death penalty. The empirical studies presented in
261 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before
and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 47 (2007) (“McCleskey is the Dred
Scott decision of our time.”); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The
Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
433, 433 (1995) (“Capital punishment, one of America’s most prominent vestiges of slavery
and racial violence, is flourishing once again in the United States.”); Cohen, supra note 230,
at 72–78 (2012) (tracing the role of race in post-McCleskey death penalty administration);
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (“Professor Bedau does not exaggerate when he
compares McCleskey to Plessy and Korematsu.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s
Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (2002) (concluding that
the burden placed on Blacks by McCleskey “puts black defendants in the position of having
their actions . . . punished more harshly than similarly situated white defendants,” “shows a
disregard for black victims,” and “shows a systemic disregard for black communities”); David
G. Savage, How Did They Get It So Wrong?: Left and Right Differ on the Decisions, but Each
Side Has its ‘Worst’ List, 95 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2009, at 20, 21 (noting that a dozen surveyed law
professors and court experts cited McCleskey as the Court’s third worst decision in recent
decades); John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 23, 2010, at 8,
14 (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE
OF ABOLITION (2010)) (describing Supreme Court jurisprudence and race in death penalty
cases); Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address at DePaul Law Review Symposium: Race to
Execution (Oct. 24, 2003), in 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1699, 1706 (2004) (stating that McCleskey
illustrates that the Court views a certain amount of discrimination as “inevitable”); Bryan A.
Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in
Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 510 (1994) (“[I]t is precisely this acceptance
of bias and the tolerance of racial discrimination that has come to define America’s criminal
justice system.”).
262 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 31–43 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/5

72

Levinson et al.: Deadly 'Toxins'

2021]

DEADLY “TOXINS”

297

this Article were designed with this process-focused inquiry in
mind, and the study results lead to the conclusion that race and
ethnicity are automatically associated with—and are inseparable
from—the death penalty’s future dangerousness determination.
These findings give rise to new and particularized constitutional
concerns that deserve careful consideration.
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